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... The Best Is Yet To Be
It is wisely said of a good marriage that "the first
hundred years are the hardest," and that wisdom
also speaks for the good marriage of Valparaiso
University and its School of Law. Twenty years
after the founding of the Northern IndianaN ormal
School in 1859, it was wise enough to marry the
young Northern Indiana Law School. The following century "for richer, for poorer, for better,
for worse" deepened that bond into the mutual care
and respect which crown the marriages of the deeply
committed.
This issue of the Cresset is one way the University
and its School of Law say "Happy Anniversary!" to
one another and share the centennial celebration
with their friends. Throughout this issue the recent
students, faculty, and friends of the School of Law
turn their attention to the tasks of a distinguished
School of Law and, as importantly, to the tasks of a
distinctive School of Law which exuberantly takes
the Christian faith seriously. The University cheers
the School of Law for its century of achievementand urges it to even greater academic excellence,
legal audacity, and intellectual exploration of the
Christian tradition in which they commonly stand.
It is fitting that our October alumni columnists·
should be graduates of both the University and the
School of Law. Our first columnist, Bruce Berner,
took his B.A. in 1965 and his J.D. in 1967, then
earned his LL.M. from Yale in 1978. While on the
faculty of the School of Law he also serves as special
deputy prosecutor for the state of Indiana in its case
of homicide against the Ford Motor Company for
its allegedly lethal Pinto gas tank design. As both
our alumni columnists witness, a long tradition of
the School of Law is its concern for human rights.
Alumnus Berner turns our attention to the limits of
the Bill or Rights as an instrument for their protection.
Our second alumni columnist, Dierdre A. Burgman, took her B.A. in 1970 as an English major and
her J.D. in centennial1979. While a student she was
a member of the moot court team and the Valparaiso
University Law Review which Bruce helped to found
and edit in his student days. Dierdre now serves the
Honorable Paul H. Buchanan, Jr., Chief Judge of
the Indiana Court of Appeals, as his clerk. In her
contribution concerning human rights, alumna
Burgman discusses why "truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth" is not, and ought not be,
the utmost concern in the judicial process.
The Cresset welcomes alumni Berner and Burgman to IN LUGE TUA .
The Editor
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The Bill of Rights
And the Restraint
Of Government
Bruce Berner

One of the most pervasive and dangerous misconceptions extant today is that law can solve all, or even most,
social problems; to complicate matters, most current legal
problems are seen as having constitutional dimension.
Once we viewed uncivil neighbors, insensitive schoolteachers, and ignorant parents as merely rude, annoying,
or simply a shame. Today we see them as defendants in
federal courts under seige by the pin-stripe army. My
thesis is that asking the Bill of Rights to solve most of
life's problems is both foolish and dangerous. Not only
does such a misuse of the Bill of Rights introduce its
provisions into areas not tractable to constitutional adjustment; it subtly erodes its usefulness in fighting its real
enemy-government. It seems to me fitting in the centennial year of the Valparaiso University School of Law
to reflect a bit on the Bill of Rights, soon to celebrate its
bicentennial.
To illustrate how we arrived at this point, it is necessary
first to outline how the typical lawyer approaches a legal
problem with possible constitutional implications. He
almost invariably relies on two (and only two) avenues of
analysis-text and history. He wouldn't think of analyzing
a free-speech case without first reading the First Amendment. Then he would look to both pre-passage and postpassage history and be interested, more or less, in what
both James Madison and Earl Warren had to say on the
subject. Finally, he would report to the Court those
decisions most nearly on point (provided, of course, they
lead the Court in the appropriate direction), and hope
for the best.
This lawyer might be shocked to learn that many
thoughtful non-lawyers who also think about the Constitution think about it in a wholly different way. Many
have strong feelings about free speech yet have not read
the First Amendment nor any cases interpreting it.
Frankly, this leaves them in a better position to understand free speech. Reading the amendment is quite misleading, for it provides "Congress shall make no law
abridging freedom of speech ... " It doesn't say "State
legislatures shall make no law ... ," but, a lawyer would
quickly add, the Fourteenth Amendment does. That provision, however, says only that every person shall have
3
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as simply a shame. Today we see them in court under siege by the pin-stripe army.

"due process of law," the layman (had he read the text)
would respond. "But that," says the lawyer, "means 'no
state shall abridge free speech.' " So much for textual
exegesis. And while history must always be consulted, it
does not always yield unproblematic solutions to current
problems. When Chief Justice Marshall said "We must
never forget it is a Constitution we are expounding," he
urged vision as well as knowledge. While new judicial
interpretations of the Constitution are often criticized as
"legislation," there is simply no sensible alternative to
dynamic adjustment of ancient words and values to new
contexts. The Framers certainly did not consider television as part of the "press," but the Court would be
rightly criticized if it did not include television as within
the First Amendment.

Constitutional Rights Are Prohibitions
The critical problem with the text/history analysis is
that, once it is exhausted and no answer appears, no
widely-shared coherent system for resolving the problem
exists. Nor would I pretend to propose one here because
the solution appears to me to require the expertise and
co-operation of sociologists, social pyschologists, political
scientists, economists, and lawyers. I do however, suggest,
~trictly from a lawyer's point of view, that a small corner
of the problem is helped by paying greater attention to
the purpose of the Constitution, and, particularly, the
purpose of the first ten amendments. In addition to asking
what the Framers wrote and what they thought of what
they wrote, we must ask why they felt constrained to
write anything at all.
History makes clear that the Framers did not believe
the Bill of Rights created "rights"; some opposed their
inclusion as superfluous. Indeed, in the .Declaration of
Independence, the same men held the same rights as
"self-evident." The Bill of Rights does not create "rights"
(though the word "right" appears); instead it creates
prohibitions against the government's acting in particular
ways. If a private citizen breaks into your home and steals
your radio, you are the victim of an "unreasonable search
and seizure" in common parlance, but the Constitution is
not implicated unless the thief works, directly or indirectly, for the State. You have a "right" to be free from
this burglar but not a Constitutional right. Thus, all
"rights" in the Bill of Rights are held only vis-a-vis government. As a right imports a correlative duty in someone
else, Constitutional "rights" are simply the power to insist that government respect certain prohibitions.
This statement, to be sure, breaks no new groundall lawyers know that "state action" must exist before the
Constitution is implicated. But once that "state action" is
found, courts (including the Supreme Court) often shift
attention onto the individual who owns "rights" and lose
4

sight of the state whose action is under scrutiny. This is
no mere quibble over logic or semantics. Results change
with the focus. Sometimes this faulty focus generates
less protection, sometimes more, but most often leads to
inquiries wildly beside the point. It breeds the notion
that the Constitution exists to protect us from all of life's
annoyances. The truth is that it exists solely to protect us
from government.
To illustrate how adopting either the "rights" perspective or the "prohibition" perspective leads to different
results, assume that X is charged with robbery, and A, the
sole eyewitness, is an indispensable prosecution witness.
Just prior to trial, A becomes seriously ill and cannot
testify, though it appears A will become able to testify in
a year or two. X insists that the case must be dismissed
since the Sixth Amendment guarantees the "right" to a
"speedy trial." If we focus on X, he seems to have a valid
objection ; he did not, after all, cause the delay nor is
there any obvious reason to make him suffer for it.
Viewed in this way , he appears to have a "right" to a
speedy trial which , under the circumstances, he will
surely win. Nor do the Constitution's text or history
suggest anything to the contrary.
If, however, we consider the purpose of the Sixth
Amendment, the "right to a speedy trial" becomes "the
right to insist that government do nothing to prevent a
speedy trial." As government in no way caused A's illness,
X is not entitled to dismissal, though the circumstances
should entitle him to release pending trial. Now it may
well be that thoughtful people would think X's case should
be dismissed. This judgment involves balancing the harm
to X of the stigma of accusation and society's interest in
enforcing criminal laws. The point here is that the Constitution does not compel dismissal for government has
breached no prohibition. And the danger under the
"rights" perspective is that once a court holds that X has
no "right" here, it may be difficult to restore that "right"
to a defendant when the government causes a witness's
absence. Under the "prohibition" perspective, the distinction is easily forced into view.
A spectacular example of confusion generated by looking at Constitutional guarantees as a series of general
"rights" is the free-press-fair-trial controversy. To oversimplify (but only ·a little), the debate takes the form:
Since the press's "right" to report news often leads to
situations in which a criminal defendant's "right" to an
impartial jury is prejudiced, which "right" must give
way? Some suggest (always gingerly, apologetically, and
qualifiedly) that government restrain the press. Others
suggest that some criminal defendants will simply become
too notorious to be given a fair trial and, so must be
released. (Most of these writers are apologetic, too, but
several are rather brash about it.) The Supreme Court
has not, to date, recognized a fact situation in which
The Cresset

The Constitution was not conceived to solve life's problems; if it were, it wouldn't work.
It was conceived to restrict government and free us to solve life's problems ourselves.

either "right" could not be fully accorded, though it has
been forced to weaken its definition of "impartial juror"
to avoid the ultimate question. (In the sixties, a juror
exposed to massive pretrial publicity could be challenged
for cause. As the media's ability [and relish] to disseminate
massive amounts of "crime" information improved, a
"good juror" became "hard to find." At Jack Ruby's trial
for Oswald's murder, for example, how much confidence
should we have reposed in twelve men and women who
professed no knowledge or opinion of the case? Now the
Court holds an informed juror with an opinion on a case
"impartial" if he persuades the judge he will "lay that
opinion aside.")
Both the courts and commentators have, it is suggested
here, muddled the question by focusing on "rights." If,
instead, we view the Constitution only as prohibiting
government from restraining the press and prohibiting
government from prejudicing jurors, the "conflict" of
rights evaporates. If government, through the police
and prosecutors, does not itself seek publicity, and if
government does all it can to minimize publicity (including at times "gagging" state officials, but not gagging
the press), any resulting prejudice is simply not caused
by government and not protected by the Sixth Amendment. The "right" to an impartial jury is thus seen as the
"right to insist that government not create biased jurors."
Of course, the court must try to secure the most impartial
jury because the court is part of government and must,
therefore, do all it can to protect the defendant's interest.
Once it does all this, however, it has respected the prohibitions of both the First and Sixth Amendments.

No Government Is Better Than We Are
The defendant, under this analysis, may now constitutionally be tried by a jury prejudiced against him.
Viewpoints will surely differ on the appropriateness of
such a trial: some will see it as a spectacle unworthy of a
free society; others will argue that a jury's function is to
reflect widely-shared community beliefs even when labeled "prejudices." It is a complex, important question
and we will have to resolve it. The point here is that the
Constitution does not resolve it, for it was not meant even
to address it. The solution may take the form of legislation, but may just as easily come from community
pressure against the criminal justice system or against
the press itself. (The press's First Amendment protection does not include freedom from our interference,
only government interference.) The most preferred solution is that jurors actually will "lay aside their opinions"
and try the defendant fairly on the evidence, since such is
so central a part of the American credo. If no one thinks a
defendent should have a fair trial, he won't have one, and
the Constitution, however interpreted, will prove of no
October, 1979

use to him. Citizens cannot have a government which is
better than they are. What is more, they don't deserve
one.
One line of cases vividly demonstrates how the "rights"
perspective can lessen individual protection. The Supreme Court noted that whenever we speak confidentially
to a friend, we bear the risk that he will betray that confidence. Thus, if one confesses a crime to a friend who
·relays that information to the police, no constitutional
violation occurs when such testimony is used to convict. Undoubtedly, the defendant in such a case feels
victimized, yet there is no way to prevent this short of
speaking to no one. This is surely one of life's agonizing
little problems. Having said this, the Court made a
remarkable jump of logic. Since the risk of betrayal
inheres in daily living, the government, said the Co~rt,
is free to send its agents to court a person's friendship,
record his conversations, and play them back for a jury.
But this doesn't follow any more than to say that since
traffic accidents are a common risk, the government can
hire people to run into others with their cars. We ought
to anticipate that when we go outside in the rain we will
get wet, but this hardly authorizes police to spray us with
hoses. The flaw, again, is in focusing on "rights" without
making it clear whose duty correlates with those rights.
Under these decisions, when a person has no "right" to
expect freedom from a given risk, the government is
allowed to attach itself to that risk and thus augment it.
Focusing on the prohibition against government, on
the other hand, sharpens the question and alters the
result. A citizen has no constitutional right to be free
from betrayal by a friend, not because such risk "inheres
in life," but because the betrayal is in no way attributable
to government. When it is, the case is altogether different.
Government spies for domestic surveillance "inhere"
only in a society which lets them inhere. The Constitution
can't control our friends; it was intended to control government.
The last example demonstrates how focus on the rightholder generates nonsensical inquiries. Each of us has a ·
privilege under the Fifth Amendment to be free from
state-compelled self-incrimination. Confessions produced by torture or psychological third-degree methods
are inadmissible in a criminal trial. In its landmark
Miranda decision in 1966, the Court focused appropriately
on government action and prescribed police procedure
for interrogating suspects, including the now-familiar
warnings of the right to remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning. These warnings were
required, noted the Court, because custodial interrogation is "implicitly coercive." Once having properly focused on the government's action, the Court then changed
lenses and held that a suspect could waive the protections
of silence and a lawyer if he does so "knowingly and in5

telligently." First, the same elements which may implicitly coerce confessions may implicitly coerce a waiver.
It is not clear how someone can intelligently waive the
presence of a lawyer any more than he can intelligently
confess. Beyond this, however, the waiver holding forces
courts to concentrate on the defendant's age, general intelligence, possible psychological determinants of his
behavior, and then make judgments on whether the act
of confessing somehow makes sense. The intelligent are
convicted; the others have their confessions suppressed.
It is those others who are done the greatest disservicethey are not even accorded the simple dignity of being
forced to live with their own choices. It is as demoralizing
to them as to the chess player whose more advanced opponent says, "Oh, you can take that move back if you like
because it just hands me the game." The decision would
have pressed more important inquiries into view (and
been truer to the Constitution's purpose) if it continued
to keep its eye on the police. Having the police read
warnings from a preprinted card and then do everything
possible to extract an "intelligent" waiver does not fully
monitor the prohibition which the Fifth Amendment
announces. What that langl,lage requires is systematic
care in giving the suspect all the information he needs to
make a choice and not biasing that choice in any way. In
some cases, the police will become aware that the suspect
is in no condition to make any choice without rest, communication withrelatives, friends, or an attorney. His
intelligence may be important, but only to aid in determining whether the police acted reasonably. If the police
give the appropriate information and do not bias the
choice, that choice is the suspect's, and it seems irrelevant
whether he makes it intelligently or not.

A Big Task for a Small Piece of Paper
The Constitution cannot and should not protect people
from their own choices. It should, however, protect them
from overreaching by government. This distinction is
recognized nicely in the field of the doctor-patient relationship under the rubric "informed consent." Giving
all the necessary information is the doctor's responsibility; consenting or not is up to the patient. The Constitution cannot, and should not, relieve us of the consequences of our own actions; it exists precisely to leave us
with our choices free from an overbearing government.
The Constitution was not conceived to solve life's
problems; if it were, it wouldn't work. It was conceived to
restrict government and free us to solve life's problems
ourselves. It cannot protect us from our friends, whether
they betray our confidence or decide our case in a biased
way; it cannot protect us from a press all too eager to "get
the story" regardless of others' feelings; it cannot protect us from ourselves, but leaves us free to be as intelligent
or foolish as we choose. It can, however, if properly understood, control government. That seems to me a big
enough task for such a little piece of paper.

Cl
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IN LUCE TUA II
The Truth
Which Does Not
Make Us Free ·
Dierdre A. Burgman
Recently the American legal system has been publicly
indicted-even by some of its own judges- for its failure
to conduct a vigorous pursuit of "truth." Many facets of
the system are cited in support of this charge, among
them the battle-like confrontation spawned by the adversary method, the circumscribed role of the jury, and
the evidentiary limitations which preclude an airing of
the "whole story." Of course, if the system is to better
itself, it must heed such criticism. Taken too seriously,
however, the demand for a search for truth could undermine if not destroy the deeper principles upon which the
system is built.
No one.could seriously suggest that our system ignores
truth. Nearly every rule of evidence is designed to focus
on the most reliable proof. The general prohibition
against hearsay testimony, for instance, is an attempt to
secure trustworthy evidence which can be tested by crossexamination. Similarly, judicial reluctance to accept as
conclusive the results of polygraph tests exemplifies a
concern for the state of that scientific art. Moreover, all
testimony is made under oath, with a penalty for perjury.
Thus, the charge against the system is not that it ignores
truth, but that it does not pursue truth strenuously enough.
That argument admits of two closely-related errors.
First, it confuses two meanings of the word "truth." More
specifically, it muddles the meanings in proposing a
"search for truth." Virtually every great philosopher or
scientist has used that phrase to describe the pursuit of
some ultimate theory, formula, or perspective on the
universe-a Weltanschauung. What critics of our legal
system mean, on the other hand, is ordinary fact-finding.
By confounding the two meanings in one argument, they
elevate a relatively insignificant "truth" to cosmic significance.
Furthermore, the argument erroneously assumes that
truth is properly the utmost concern of the judicial
process. The Constitution itself commands a different
conclusion. Prior to the American Revolution, a diligent
search for truth had characterized the proceedings of the
torious Star Chamber. The United States Constitution
sought to prevent the recurrence of such inquiries. That
the Framers did not consider fact-finding the top priority
is demonstrated by two amendments, the fourth (proThe Cresset

The framers of the Constitution placed fundaments/liberty above a search for truth.
The blameworthy as well as the innocent are thus protected from overzealous government.

hibiting unreasonable searches and seizures) and fifth
(guaranteeing freedom from compelled self-incrimination). Those amendments mediated governmental and
private interests; they assured that the state could prove
truth only in certain ways, by establishing a legal barrier
beyond which the government's search for truth could
not continue. In a sense, then, the Framers placed human
dignity, fundamental liberty, and personal privacy above
a search for truth. Accordingly, the blameworthy as well
as the innocent are protected from overzealousness of the
government in its quest for the truth about criminal
conduct.
For many years, though, the fourth and fifth amendments accorded only limited protection. The "exclusionary rule," which renders illegal evidence inadmissible in trials in federal courts, was deemed not
binding on state courts, where the bulk of criminal cases
are tried. This is not to say that the Constitution was not
applicable to state proceedings, but only that there was
no remedy for a state's infringement of those rights.
Hence the states could disregard the amendments, seizing
evidence unlawfully and using it to prove the guilt of
defendants tried under state law; there was no federal
sanction against their actions. In the landmark case of
Mapp v. Ohio in 1961, the Supreme Court finally fashioned
a remedy for such violations: it extended the "exclusionary rule" to the states, finding that result mandated
by the fourteenth amendment's pledge of"due process of
law" in state courts. Three years later the Court imposed
a similar rule regarding involuntary confessions. In so
doing, it recognized that a right without a remedy is
really no right at all. The search for truth was not so
important as to supersede the dictates of the Constitution.
Indeed, the "search for truth" as a value in itself was
unfamiliar to our jurisprudence until very recently. This
turnabout was occasioned by a perceived need for discovery in criminal cases. Discovery is a process whereby
each side in a lawsuit learns in advance of trial what
evidence the other side knows of or intends to introduce.
In a civil case the process provides for a more orderly
presentation of evidence and heightens the chances of
settlement without trial. To extend this process to criminal cases, however, was an enormous and controversial
step. Disclosure by a defendant would come perilously
close to compelled self-incrimination; disclosure by the
prosecution might foster perjury and jeopardize the
safety of witnesses. Apparently to make the suggestion of
criminal discovery more palatable, jurists began to speak
of aiding the search for truth. "Search for truth," therefore, may be a smokescreen obscuring the realities of the
criminal justice system.
Although it often escapes unmentioned, there is a
critical difference between the criminal and civil systems,
and for. this reason the extension of the search-for-truth
October, 1979

concept to the criminal sphere is crucial. Civil lawsuits
are nearly always between private parties, whereas a
criminal prosecution involves the government as both
opposing party and judge. To give the government carte
blanche authority to seek out facts , present them as
evidence, and decide the outcome is to place the criminal
defendant in a totally defenseless position. It also begs
abuse by offering the state the power to manufacture
evidence against its opponents. Thus, the subordination
of truth to elemental privacy and individual integrity is
not the mark of an erring societal conscience. It signifies
a society which realizes the awesome power of government and seeks to confine that power through disabilities
restricting police investigation. The wisdom of including
such disabilities in the Bill of Rights has been unquestioned for nearly two centuries, and any move to subvert
that decision in favor of "truth" should be vigilantly
scrutinized.
Unfortunately, quite apart from the innovation of
criminal discovery, that move has already begun. In 1976
in Stone v. Powell, the Supreme Court ruled that federal
courts would no longer grant habeas corpus relief to state
prisoners on the basis of fourth-amendment claims after
state courts have given the claims adequate hearings. 1
Other cases have declared that the opportunity for an
adequate hearing is enough, so if the claim is not raised
in state court, it is probably lost forever. Although the
Powell decree sounds like a narrow, minor ruling, it
actually discards the rule of Mapp. v. Ohio, undermines
the meaning of the fourth amendment, and readies the
way for further inroads upon constitutional rights in the
name of a search for truth.

The Two Meanings of the Word '"Truth"
The force of Stone v. Powell can scarcely be appreciated
without an understanding of the history and meaning of
habeas corpus relief. Also known as "the Great Writ,"
habeas corpus dates from antiquity. It was written into
English law in 1679 and subsequently placed in Article I
of the United States Constitution. That instrument sets
no conditions upon the application for such relief, and
states that the right may not be suspended except in time
of war. This American approach mirrored the practice in
England, where the House of Lords ruled in 1704 that
"every Englishman" had a right to habeas corpus, regardless of the authority by which he was held prisoner.
Our constitutional right to habeas corpus is explained by
Congressional statute: a defendant may petition for
habeas corpus relief whenever he is imprisoned "in vi'Habeas corpus (Latin: you have the body) is an order requiring that a
prisoner be brought before a court at a stated time to decide the
legality of his detention; the right of habeas corpus safeguards one
against illegal detention.

7

The subordination of truth to privacy is not the mark of an erring societal conscience.
It signifies a society which realizes the power of government and seeks to restrain it.

olation of the constitution ... or law of the United States."
If criminal proceedings transgress any constitutional directive, a federal court could review such proceedings
and order release of the prisoner. The specter of such
"collateral" review assured respect of a defendant's rights,
particularly throughout his trial.
Against this background of centuries of habeas corpus
as the ultimate protection of civil liberty stands the Powell
decision. Distinguishing fourth amendment claims as
different in kind from other constitutional violations,
the Court held that search-and-seizure infringements
may not be redressed by habeas corpus since they "do not
impugn the integrity of the fact-finding process"; in fact,
illegally seized evidence was termed "evidence which exposes the truth." The Court thus declined to recognize,
for purposes of habeas corpus, violations which prove
that a defendant really did commit a crime. The Court
discriminated between guilt-related and non-guilt-related constitutional violations: if the violations adds
trustworthy evidence of guilt, no collateral relief is warranted; otherwise, collateral reliefis appropriate.

The Dual Nature of the Word '"Guilt"
What this approach to collateral review ignores is the
dual nature of the word "guilt." There is guilt in a factual
sense, and there is guilt in a legal sense. The former has
no relevance in our process of criminal justice; no person
is "guilty" until he is legally proven guilty. Moreover,
the law determines how guilt may be proven. Hence
tangible proof that a defendant committed a crime does
not establish his guilt if such evidence exceeds the bounds
of legitimate proof. Stone v. Powell abrogates this basic
premise of our juristic scheme, substituting another
definition of guilt- the same definition as that of "truth"
in the argument raised against the system as a whole.
How could the Court justify such a result? Despite its
radical departure from the presumption of innocence,
the pivotal Powell case commends itself as a mere expression of federal judicial passivity. The decision is couched
in terms of "comity" and "federalism," words used to
indicate our federal system of state and United States
courts. Because of comity, says the opinion, the United
States system should not interfere with the state systems.
The inadequacy of such reasoning is exposed by the
fourteenth amendment, by which the federal system
exacts certain requirements of justice from the states; the
federal system is not to be indifferent to state wrongs. So
notwithstanding its notions of comity, the Powell decree
is clearly a preference for "truth" above liberty.
The Court also rationalized that preference by assigning a narrow function to the exclusionary rule. It said the
rule's purpose is simply to deter unlawful police conduct;
collateral review is so remote from a defendant's trial as
8

to provide no deterrence to police conduct. While it is
true that Mapp identified deterrence as one reason for
the exclusionary rule, thal case advanced an additional
reason-integrity of the judicial process. The jurisprudential achievement of Mapp was its realization that a
system which breaks its own rules sacrifices respectability.
Powell discounts that rationale, holding instead that exclusion of illicit evidence is "not a personal right."
To so devalue fourth-amendment interests is tantamount to overruling Mapp, ~ high point in the progress
of criminal justice. Absent the threat of nullification by a
federal court, there is little to prevent a state court from
disregarding the exclusionary rule altogether. Granted,
a defendant may still seek direct Supreme Court review
on a writ of certiorari (similar to an appeal); however, the
sheer volume of such requests precludes the granting of
most. The simple fact is that over a period of many years
the high Court gradually has abdicated its position as
overseer of state prisoners' claims by certiorari, relying
instead on the federal district courts to review them by
habeas corpus writs. With that avenue of review now
closed, certiorari remains a defendant's only hope, but
ever an unlikely one. Should the states now retreat to
admitting unlawfully seized evidence, the Supreme Court
could not possibly hear all consequent claims of constitutional infirmity.
Predictably, it is suggested that this would never happen. Even at the time Mapp was decided, many of the
states had self-imposed rules equivalent to the federal
exclusionary rule. Nevertheless, the Powell decision is
alarming. To differentiate among prisoners entitled to
seek habeas corpus relief is a serious shift in the long
history of a "Great Writ" which guaranteed inevitable
justice, however long denied.
Yet perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Stone v.
Powell is its future, rather than its past. As two dissenting
justices noted, the thrust of the contention undergirding
Powell is not necessarily confined to searches and seizures.
The same rationale could justify denial of petitions
regarding double jeopardy, entrapment, self-incrimination, Miranda warnings, and invalid identification procedures. Viewed in light of the guilt-related/non-guiltrelated categorization, virtually all constitutional promises
become potentially meaningless.
To maintain the full meaning of any right, society
must recognize and affirm the price of that right. In other
words, if the people are "to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects" as the fourth amendment
prescribes, they must be willing to forgo some of the
"truth" that searches and seizures of those items could
produce. Every rule of evidence is a value judgmenta statement of priorities-as is every dictate of the Bill of
Rights. If "truth" is worth the price of all those rights, or
any of them, then "truth" can hardly make us free.
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The law is not like life. Therein lies its utility and even
its majesty. The law is not like life. Therein lies its
weakness and even its danger. To be sure, the law is part
of life; it is part of that communal experience we call
history, including this present moment. Law itself, as we
shall emphasize, has a history. And yet, when we speak of
"The Law" we imply that it is something distinct from
ordinary experience. It has a normative status by which
we order, remedy, and judge the interactions that make
up what we call "life."
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Legal virtues are impartiality, rationality, objectivity,
equality, consistency, and fairness. Such virtues have
only limited applicability in the larger realm of life. Life
is marked by preference and passion, by contingency
and contradiction, by gradations of merit and success, by
tragedy and serendipity, by fancy and whim. Most of all,
life-in both endowments and opportunities-is unfair.
Law that mirrored life would be no law at all. And life
ruled by law alone is deadly.
Our understanding of law is subject to both distortions.
Our society becomes ever more litigious as people seek
securities and solutions in law. In part this is because
lawyers encourage the extra business; in larger part it is
because people have been taught and have come to
believe that they are entitled to protection against the
insecurities of existence. Thus, for example, the intimacies of marriage and friendship are increasingly subjected to the calculus of legal contract. To take a more
bizarre example, some lawyers at a recent Congressional
hearing on the regulation of religious cults proposed
consumer protection laws against false or dangerous
ideas.
Contracts spare us the uncertainties of human relationships. The covenant of trust mutually pledged is, by
comparison, precarious and arduous in its demand for
constant renewal in love. The sensible person knows the
difference between law and life. He knows that life is
fully lived in the risks of decision and the insecurities of
commitment beyond the call of contract. He knows that,
in the things that really matter, the litigious life is no life
at all.
If life, in all its mystery and diversity, cannot be ruled
by law, neither can law be subjected entirely to the mysteries and diversities of life. The law is not merely an
instrument for solving problems, a set of rules to be
manipulated to advantage by the clever and powerful.
Admittedly, the law may sometimes seem to be no more
than that, but most of us persist in believing it should be
more than that. To speak of "The Law" in terms of awe
and majesty ' may be no more than an exercise in "false
consciousness," as the Marxists say, an indulgence in
mystification. After all, "The Law" is patently a very
human thing. Prick it, and does it not bend? Tickle it,
and does it not accommodate? Wrong it, and does it not
revenge? Like Shylock, the law is not a thing apart from
life.
Or is it? Is it merely useful to think so, or is it true, that
the law has its own integrity, its own logic, its own
authority? While the law is clearly susceptible to our
decisions, is there not another sense in which our decisions are accountable to the law? I do believe that is so.
While it is a part of life, the law calls life to account. That
is to say that the law possesses authority. Without such
authority the law is merely a bundle of rules backed up
by force; with such authority, the law is a power we are
bound to acknowledge. The word "bound" is important
in this connection. In Latin "to bind" is religare, from
which comes, of course, religion.
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At the center of any life worth living is the ordering of
our loyalties-accepting the responsibility to decide by
what we will be bound. The life without obligations that
are freely accepted and faithfully observed is a life in
bondage to chaos, a life without meaning. With greater
and lesser degree of reflection, we bind ourselves in
friendship, in marriage, in vocation, and a host of other
decisions. The obligation that we affirm most deeply,
most daringly, and perhaps most desperately, is our
religion. Our religion may be called a religion, such as
Christianity or Buddhism, or it may be a variation of
religion, such as atheism, or it may be a political program
or humanitarian ideal or an aspiration to some excellence. It may be superficial or profound, a false god or
true, but it is that by which we are bound and which bond
we affirm, or at least want to affirm.
Such a religious bond is not at our disposal; we do not
possess it, and it is prior to our being possessed by it; to it
we hold ourselves accountable because to it we are accountable. Having decided upon the ordering of our
loyalties, our loyalties order us. After chdosing our obligations, we discover they have chosen us. And Jesus said,
"You have not chosen me but I have chosen you." (John
15:16) In theological jargon it is called prevenient grace,
the grace that is always a step ahead of us, turning our
achievements into gifts, our discoveries into revelations,
and our choices into the knowledge of being chosen.

The Law is Not Simply a Body of Rules
Laws may be just or unjust, wise or foolish, but behind
the laws is the law. It binds us before we embrace it, and
indeed whether or not we embrace it. A lawyer may be an
officer of the court, an agent of a particular law, butand it is not mere hyperbole to say it-he is a servant of
the law. And, although not with the same occupational
intensity, so it is with all of us. We are dealing here with
what the philosophers have called "moral sentiments":
shame, guilt, resentment, indignation, reciprocity, trust,
mercy, and the like. It can be argued, of course, that such
sentiments are not truly universal and therefore cannot
be made necessary to the foundation of law. To be sure,
there may be people unacquainted with guilt or shame or
pride, just as others may be incapable of love. But in our
communal conversation about the meaning of law we
should not give veto power to the handicapped. Musicians do not defer to the tone deaf, nor painters to the
color blind. Moral sentiments may not be universally
distributed-they certainly are not evenly distributedbut then, neither is anything else of value.
My contention is that moral sentiments point to a
prevenient reality. This is not an argument from logic;
namely, that there must be a reality prior and related to
such sentiments. That argument from logic can be made,
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but here I would appeal to experience. The pioneer
sociologist of knowledge, Alfred Schutz, spoke of an" Ah,
ha!" experience. It is the moment in which we are surprised by the self-evident. It is seeing what we had not
seen before but what had been there all along; and,
having seen it, it is impossible to imagine not having seen
it. It immediately becomes a part of "taken for granted
reality" without which the world is inexplicable. Thus
this latest step in discovery becomes the first step, and
conclusion turns out to be the premise.
Moral sentiments are part of our experience. To deny
their existence is the kind of solipsism that among sophomores passes for profundity. (Yet, as we shall note, they are
ignored, if not denied, in much legal theory today.) And
these sentiments-such as guilt, shame, gratitude, and
the like-are inherently relational. That is, they do not
exist in a vacuum; the experience is related to someone
or something beyond itself. Guilt is to say you are sorry;
gratitude is to give thanks; resentment is to protest. The
experience and the expression, the feeling and the language, are not two distinct things, as though one were the
cause and the other the effect. No, the phenomenon we
call guilt, or gratitude, is itself relational. To experience
it is to be related to that which occasions guilt, or gratitude, or shame, or resentment. It is to be related to
something that is religious, having to do with the religare,
with a network of binding of which our obligations are
part.
At this point you may suspect me of having smuggled
God into the argument, and that rather clumsily. I assure
you that is not true. At the appropriate time I will
announce his entrance quite candidly. (Although I admit
that I believe we will then discover he has been here right
along, he being the prime example of the conclusion that
turns out to be the premise.) At the moment I want to
suggest that this network of binding to which we are
related by moral sentiments is what we mean by the law.
The law is more than the sum of its parts. There are laws,
for example, against indiscriminate stealing. They are
not adequately explained by reference to their utilitarian
value, nor by the fact that all societies have had such
laws. It is rather the case that there is "an all-embracing
moral reality, a purpose in the universe, which stealing
offends" (Harold J. Berman, The Interaction of Law and
Religion). We break a law, but we offend against the law.
Now offense suggests a personal event, one offends
someone. This does not prove, of course, that there is a
someone who is offended. You may drop a cherished
vase on the floor and say most sincerely to its shattered
remains, "I'm sorry." We do that sort of thing all the
time. We personalize, or anthropomorphize, inanimate
things. We do not really think for a moment that breaking
the vase offended some greater Master Vase that holds
together the "vaseness" of the universe. Yet when we
The Cresset
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break a law, our feeling is not one of having offended
against that law but having offended "The Law." This
does not prove the existence of "The Law." I merely ask
you if this is not your experience, as it is mine , and to
ponder its possible implications.
To be sure, we can attempt to "explain"-meaning to
explain away-this experience of having offended by
employing psychological and other explanatory systems.
What we mean hy "The Law" may be no more than a
residual "father image" or the after-glow of traumatic
punishment experienced during potty training. The
trouble with such explanations is that they are reductionist and finally trivializing; they do not do justice to
the relational character of our moral sentiments. The
person who insists that my experience of a Mozart piano
sonata is not an encounter with beauty but a neurochemical response to physical vibrations has said nothing
of consequence about the experience, but he has said a
great deal about his own poverty, if not perversity, of
mind. His explanation, so to speak, is not more logical; it
is simply less interesting.
I am suggesting, then, that, while the law is of necessity unlike life in some respects, it is rooted in life
experience. I further suggest that that experience is relational, pointing to something other than itself. It is, in
short, of enormous consequence that people have a sense
of right and wrong. The experience of right and wrong,
in turn, relates to a more universal rightness and wrongness, which is reflected in the law. The person who says
the sense of right and wrong is meaningless is, if taken at
face value, revealing a deplorable personal deficiency.
For those who know the reality of right and wrong, to ask
what it "means" is meaningless.
Of course one might ask what the sense of right and
wrong means in the sense of what does it imply in this
case or that. But the sense of right and wrong itself is the
conclusion that turns out to be the premise of all other
meanings. But what is to be done about the person who
persists in challenging the reality of the experience of
right and wrong? Well, one should be patient of course,
and, if one is a believer, one should pray for him . That
some people lack a moral sense no more negates the
existence of morality and what it implies than does the
frequent lack of clear reasoning negate the existence of
rationality. In morality, as in music, the arts, the sciences,
or anything else of importance, reasonable discourse
should not be stymied by the veto power of the handicapped.
So far, however, we have spoken of the law in terms of
personal and somewhat individual experience. The personal dimension is important because, however much
our ideas may be socially constructed and conditioned, it
is as individual persons that we give our yes or no to the
moral sense that 'is the foundation of law. Yet the law is
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preeminently a social phenomenon. However we
severally acknowledge that which is binding, it is together that we spell out those acknowledgments in the
bonding that creates community. Law is by definition a
public enterprise; it is trans-subjective. We can withhold
our subjective acknowledgment or assent from the reality
to which our moral sense points, but we cannot, without
abandoning the world of reasonable discourse, refuse to
recognize the empirical fact of the law as it makes its
appearance in every society. Nor can it be denied thatat least in western societies, although I suspect the phenomenon is more universal- people distinguish between
particular laws and that which they call "The Law." It is
the latter that partakes of a noumenal, even divine,
character that, like religion, is binding. In every day
language a person who protests what he thinks to be the
unfairness of silliness of a particular rule is told, "But
that's the law." He may not think the rule less silly or
unfair, but he acknowledges its authority because it is
drawn from the authority of the law.

The Law is Not Self-Legitimating
Those who call themselves "realists" in jurisprudence
object that talk about the religious dimensions of law is
obscurantist mystification. (Herbert Butterfield once
remarked that "realism" is not a school of thought but a
boast.) To the charge of obscurantism and mystification,
it must be honestly answered that the origins and sustaining force of law are indeed obscure and mysterious.
There is nothing more unrealistic, in the sense of being
contrary to the evidence, than the proposal that laws are
created or obeyed apart from a communal consensus
about what is ultimately right and wrong. Nor can it be
reasonably denied that the sense of right and wrong is
inseparably connected to an awareness of prevenient
obligation, whether or not that obligation is expressed in
explicitly religious terms.
In light of all this (and with a bow to Harold J. Berman),
permit me to take a try at a definition of law. Laws issue
from and participate in the law. The law is more than a
body of rules; it is the historical, living process of people
legislating, adjudicating, administering, and negotiating
the allocation of rights and duties. Its purpose is to
prevent harm, resolve conflicts, and create means of cooperation. Its premise, from which it derives its perceived
legitimacy and therefore authority, is that it strives to
anticipate and give expression to what a people believes
to be its collective destiny or ultimate meaning within a
moral universe.
Of course any talk about ultimate meanings makes
many jurists nervous. Jurisprudence, like most intellectual enterprises in the modern world, aspires to the
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status of being "scientific" in the sense that the natural
sciences are "scientific." This in many ways is an admirable aspiration. The scientific method, as it has been
widely understood in the last two hundred years, is a
monumentally important liberation from authoritarianism.
It makes everything subject to critical reason.
Authoritarianism declared, "This is the law and it is to
be obeyed because the king (or the church, or the Bible,
or tribal custom) says so." And that was that. The law is
the law is the law, and nobody is permitted to ask, "By
what authority?" But now comes a delicious irony. Today,
after the liberation of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment, there are certain schools of positivism that also
declare that the law is the law is the law; and nobody is
permitted to ask, "By what authority?" The king forbade the query he deemed impious; some moderns deem it
irrelevant. But the point is that both proscribe what is
precisely the question of critical reason, what is the foundation of the authority that law claims for itself.
That question cannot be answered within the terms of
the law itself. That is to say, the law is not self-legitimating. To be sure, the question of legitimacy can be
suppressed, but suppression is presumably the enemy of
scientific inquiry. Once the question is asked, it must be
answered by reference to something beyond law itself.
"This law has a claim upon your observance because (fill
in the blank)." Over the years legal philosophies have
filled in the blank with many different answers.
Although evasions and circumlocutions have been
frequent, the "because" finally comes down to the question
of right and wrong. Except, of course, for those who,
bowing to the divine right of kings or to the positivism of .
existent fact, refuse to ask, "By what authority?" Critical
reason refuses to conform to the authoritarianism of pretentious kings and overweening facticity. Critical reason
invokes the "oughtness" of things in order to bring the
"isness" of things under judgment. Finally, whatever
explanations might satisfy us personally, critical reason
recognizes that the historical phenomenon of law is produced and sustained by the perception of a people that
law is somehow correlated with the way things really are,
or with the way things really should be.
It is commonly said that law has evolved from being
organic to being technical. It no longer reflects the belief
systems, customs, and traditions of the tribe, but has
become a tool chest of complex instruments to be applied
rationally for the achievement of specified social purposes. To the extent that this transition does indeed
represent a de-mystification of law, it is to be welcomed.
To the extent, however, that it inhibits critical reason
from venturing beyond the technical and utilitarian, it
becomes a new mystification. The new authoritarianism
may be worse than the old, and the new mystification
worse than the old, because they claim for themselves the
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virtue of freedom. In Orwell's "New-Speak," war is peace
and slavery is freedom. The slavery that claims to be
freedom is the most desperate slavery because it has
subsumed into itself the idea of emancipation.
Much juridical theory today-as indeed much thought
in other disciplines- is in bondage to a species of rationality
that refuses to ask, or even forbids the asking of, the
questions that get in the way of making jurisprudence an
"exact science." The desire for exactitude is inimical to
what is called the human factor, human behavior being
notoriously lacking in that prime scientific virtue, predictability. Whatever else law may be, it is a human
enterprise in response to human behavior, and human
behavior is stubbornly entangled with beliefs about right
and wrong. Law that is recognized as legitimate is therefore related to the larger universe of moral discourse that
helps shape human behavior. In short, if law is not also a
moral enterprise, it is without legitimacy or binding
force.

The Law is Not an Exact Science
An excessive emphasis upon law as technique is also
demeaning to its professional practitioners. Lawyers want
to be viewed as something more than mechanics. To the
extent that such a desire merely reflects a search for
status, it is just a piece of snobbery. After all, to be a
mechanic, an automobile mechanic, for instance, is a
perfectly honorable occupation, and one can fulfill it
without fretting about the metaphysics of transportation.
But the thoughtful jurist is vaguely repulsed by the idea
that his task is merely mechanical. It is an intuition that
should be trusted. A priest who has great confidence in
the mechanical, ex opere operata, effect of the sacraments
may content himself with doing the technical job at hand,
but that is hardly a worthy model of priesthood. So the
lawyer has a quasi-priestly role, mediating between human conflicts and what, it is hoped, is a moral universe.
The law then becomes the agreed ·upon language of
mediation. It is not so important that the lawyer who sees
his task as purely mechanical demeans himself and his
profession; more important is that such an approach
demeans the human effort to sustain moral meaning in
the universe.
If some theories would turn law into the technique of
exact science, others take quite the opposite direction.
They want to be relentlessly realistic about how law is
made and applied; there is a tone of iconoclasm, even of
cynicism, in their exultation over the arbitrariness of
law. To speak of principles or of morality is, in their
view, ludicrously naive. Some who are of this temperament say laws are the instrument of class interests, the
rules of convenience for the powerful. Others, less
ideologically inclined, emphasize accident more than
The Cresset

Much theology is not connected with any brand-name religion. A search
for ultimate meanings to provide legitimacy is a theological search.

conspiracy. Law is an arbitrary game, and the lawyer is a
skilled player of the game.
In ancient times it was said that the law is what the king
says it is. In our enlightened era it is declared that the law
is what the court says it is. No more and no less. The king
and the court may be good or bad, they may have the
counsel of wise men or scoundrels, but, if there is no
appeal beyond king or court, the law is finally capricious.
And capricious is the one thing that, by definition, law is
not supposed to be. Capriciousness has always been the
mark of tyranny. Law· that issues from the whim of
monarchs or the caprice of courts can command obedience only by force. It lacks the power of moral legitimacy.
The law is greater than the agencies of law. As the church
is under the gospel, so the court is under the law.
Churches, like courts, forget this at their peril. Neither
church nor court is self-legitimating.
Recall the earlier definition of the law: The premise of
law, from ·which it derives its perceived legitimacy and
therefore authority, is that it strives to anticipate and
give expression to what people believe to be their collective destiny or ultimate meaning within a moral universe. At this point theology enters the picture. The disciplined application of critical reason to the meaning of
life is what is here meant by theology. Pursued seriously
enough (and here is the candid announcement I promised
earlier) the question of meaning is the question of God.
Theology is the exploration into God; that is, the exploration of the ultimate or absolute meaning, the final
source and purpose, of all reality. Christian theology
works with the data of God's self-revelation in the life,
death, resurrection, and promised return of Jesus whom
we call the Christ. But there are many ways of doing
theology other than the Christian way. Much that is in
fact theology is not connected with any brand-name
religion. But, in law or any other field, the search for
ultimate meanings that provide morally binding legitimacy for any enterprise is, in this view, a theological
search.
To put it somewhat differently, theology is the disciplined reflection upon transcendent truth and value that
gives significance, perhaps eternal significance, to our
lives. It is important to underscore that, while theology
may speak of the supernatural and of other worlds, its
meaning is the meaning of this life, this world, this history
of which we are part. At least J udeo-Christian theology,
unlike that of some Eastern religions, is pledged to the
ultimate significance of this ordinary stuff of history that
makes up what we call reality. And, again in Christian
theology, the ultimate meaning of anything is to be found
in the end of that thing. As the meaning of an epoch of
history is perceived at the end of the epoch, as the
meaning of a life is perceived from the end of that life, so
the meaning of all history is revealed- if the Christian
October, 1979

gospel turns out to be true-in the End Time of the consummation of history in the Messianic Age.
But now we are getting ahead of ourselves. The Messianic Age is, after all, about as far as you can go, while
1979 is, to judge by the evidence, far short of that consummation devoutly to be wished. In this present moment we
are witnessing is social philosophy and jurisprudence
some signs of an incipient revival of theology, although,
of course, it is not called theology. But some thoughtful
persons are addressing the legitimacy crisis of modern
law by searching for transcendent meanings that can rescue
law from the tyranny of capriciousness. I will limit my
comment here to the work of John Rawls, most particularly his elegantly argued and justly influential A
Theory ofJustice.

The Law is Not Outside of History
Rawls' work should be welcomed by all who care about
the foundation and future of law. It is an important effort
to establish principle over discretion and moral purpose
over mechanical precedent. You will recall his basic
argument. He wants to redeem the idea of social contract
as the basis of law, and asks how the meaning and terms of
justice might be established in a normative way that can
transcend past and present disagreements about what is
meant by justice.
Very briefly, he argues that the meaning and terms of
justice can be established by rational persons seeking
their own interests behind a "veil of ignorance." The veil
of ignorance assures that these people do not know what
their own placement in life might be. They do not know,
in this social contract they are designing, who will be
rich and who poor, who gifted and who disadvantaged,
who the darling of fate and who life's loser. Therefore, it
is argued, they will try to maximize the chances of each
but also build in some hedging of the bets for the less
fortunate, and the result of all this will be as close an approximation of justice as we are likely to get. Obviously,
I've not done justice to his elaborate argument, but that's
the gist of it.
Rawls' noble effort has been much discussed and much
criticized. It has been noted that Rawls assumes a rather
narrow definition of the rational person, excluding, as
he does, the gambler and adventurer. It has been pointed
out that antecedent and abstract choices are qualitatively
and substantively different from choice made in particular circumstances. It is objected that it is by no means
obvious that people would choose equality as the chief
goal; they might well prefer some othr personal or social
excellence. It is proposed that Rawls' "sense of fairness"
would not necessarily be the controlling sentimentthat a sense of obligation, of altruism, or of achieving
some collective purpose might well have priority. Well,
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the criticisms are many and I am sympathetic to more
than a few of them.
But my purpose in discussing Rawls is to illustrate a
laudable intention miscarrying in a way that is symptomatic of our problems in relating law to life. The laudable
intention, again, is to restore legitimacy to law by developing a normative truth to which otherwise capricious
laws are subject. The problem, as I see it, is that Rawls'
way of establishing justice contradicts almost every part
of the definition of the law that I offered earlier. Law, it
was suggested, "is the historical, living process of people
legislating, adjudicating, administering, and negotiating
the allocation of rights and duties." But Rawls' people
behind the veil are, in fact, non-persons. They have no
history, no tradition, no vested interests, no self-knowledge, no loves, no hates, no dreams of transcendent
purpose. Living persons are distinguished by partiality,
by passion, by particularity. Instead of re-linking life
and law, Rawls has simply subsumed life into a totally
abstracted notion of justice that could not be farther
removed from the real world in which the legitimacy of
law must constantly be renewed.
It is of paramount importance that there is no history
behind the veil of ignorance. Rawls and many other
theorists assume a universe in which everything is already
in place. As Eliade and others have noted, this "scientific" approach of the secular Enlightenment is similar to
the "primitive" worldviews of ancient times. There is
finally no real history, no real contingency, no real
change; the world is either composed of static entities or
what looks like change is simply a cyclical recurrence of
the same old thing. The Judeo-Christian tradition, however, is premised upon the notion of real history, real
change, happening in an incomplete universe that is still
awaiting its promised fulfillment.
In order to establish normative truth, Rawls and others
seek an objectivity and universality that transcends existing conflicts about the meaning of law and justice. But
abstraction reaches the point of absurdity when we try to
manufacture non-existent persons to resolve existent
conflicts. Only through the application of critical reason
to public evidence can we arrive at inter-subjective truth
th'at approximates what we call objectivity. That is to say,
there is no alternative to history; only in history can we
address the problems of history.
Many students of jurisprudence have observed that
the idea of the "ongoingness" of the law-the way it
develops and grows incrementally and corrects itself-is
dependent upon the Judeo-Christian understanding of
history. Thus, in our earlier definition, it was suggested
that law has an "anticipatory" quality; it reaches forward,
so to speak, to embrace an excellence of"right order" that
has not yet been actualized. Law is therefore always provisional; the "isness" never perfectly embodies the "ought14

ness," and the "now" is at its best only a preview of the
promised "not yet." (Herein lies the validity of the
Lutheran theological notion of"two kingdoms," the kingdom of grace revealed in Jesus Christ and the kingdom of
historical experience in a creation that has not yet been
fulfilled in the established rule of that grace.)
Theinvention of a history-less notion of justice finally
miscarries because it contradicts our empirical experience of law. In addition, the legitimacy of law in a democratic society depends upon the believability of the law
and what people think life is and ought to be. The
admirably elegant reasoning of John Rawls and others is,
whether it is right or wrong, inescapably esoteric. At the
most, only a few thousand people can, or care to, read
it-and there is little agreement among them on what to
make of it. Thus the quest for universality becomes simply
the parochialism of a few intellectuals. This is not to
indict intellectuals as a class, for indeed many of my
readers are counted in their number, but it is to underscore the limitations of theories of justice that cannot be
widely shared and therefore cannot sustain a democratic
consensus regarding the legitimacy of law.

The State is Not the Source of the Law
This is precisely the cultural crisis of our society: the
popularly accessible and vibrant belief systems and
world views of our society are largely excluded from the
public arena in which the decisions are made about how
the society should be ordered. Daniel Bell ponders this
dilemma in the final part of his The Cultural Contradictions
of Capitalism and concludes, reluctantly, that the answer
lies in a more public role for religion. The conclusion
that he accepts reluctantly is the premise of all I have said
today. Specifically with regard to law, there is nothing in
store but a continuing and deepening crisis of legitimacy
if courts persist in systematically ruling out of order the
moral traditions in which western law has developed and
which bears, for the overwhelming majority of the American people, this society's sense of right and wrong. There
is in store a continuing and deepening crisis unless a
transcendent moral purpose is reasserted by which the
state can be brought under critical judgment, unless it is
made clear once again that the state is not the source but
the servant of the law.
With apologies to Spinoza, transcendence abhors a
vacuum. Today there is such a vacuum in the public
space of American law and politics. Unless it is democratically filled by the living moral traditions of the
American people, it will surely be filled, as has so tragically happened elsewhere, by the pretensions of the
modern state. As the crisis of legitimacy deepens it will
lead-not next year, maybe not in twenty, but all too
The Cresset

The Messianic age is about as far as you can go, while 1979 is, to judge
by the evidence, far short of that consummation devoutly to be wished.

soon-to totalitarianism or to insurrection or to both.
One final word. In these reflections I have focused
upon the condition of legal theory, as I understand it,
and upon related problems in secular social philosophy.
I do not want to leave the impression that I think the role
of religion and of the Christian church in particular is
above criticism. To the contrary. The exclusion of living
moral tradition from the public arena dates from the
wars of religion in the Seventeenth Century. The loveless
fanaticism of the churches forced thoughtful people to
seek some other language and some other faith on which
to ground the common life of society. It is not surprising
that social and legal theory frequently assumed an antireligious posture.
The exclusion of religion from public discourse continues today also because too many religionists and theologians perpetuate a privatized and privileged form of
belief. Salvation is privatized and individualized in a
way that implies that, quite literally, the rest ofthe world
can go to hell. And religious belief is thought to be
privileged, so that it is not vulnerable to public challenge and critical reason. So long as religion persists in
its divisive and self-protective ways, it will be justly
dismissed from the public arena as dangerously "sectarian."
There are three things that must happen (and, I am
glad to say, three things that are happening, although
not fast enough) in order to point us toward a more
promising future. First, the churches must seek full

communion and visible unity in the one Church of Christ.
This includes the secure re-establishment of Christianity's
bond with living Judaism. Only in this way will religion
in our society stop posing the threat of divisiveness and
come to be what the Church is called to be, a symbol of
the unity of humankind.
Second, the churches must once and for all be seen to
repudiate any ambition to temporal rule. At his inauguration last year John Paul I refused to be crowned
with the papal tiara, the vestigial symbol of the claim to
temporal power. John Paul II followed his good example,
and so must all the churches set aside their tiaras. It may
seem improbable to us, but there are many secularists in
this society who do most genuinely fear the church's
amibition to rule. Those fears must be put to rest if we are
ever to achieve a more natural and fruitful relationship
between church and state, between religion and the public
realm.
The third change is most directly pertinent to the celebration of the centennial of the School of Law at Valparaiso University. Yours is the School of Law within a
Christian university. To claim the name university is to
acknowledge that all the disciplines and departments
share a common universe of discourse. More particularly,
theologians and jurists are not dealing with separate
worlds and separate subject matters, but are engaged in
this one history and this common task: to enhance life by
relating it to the justice of law, and to renew law by
relating it to the ultimate meaning of life.

Cl

The law is not like life. Therein lies its utility and even its majesty.
The law is not like life_. Therein lies its weakness and even its danger.
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Louis F. Bartelt. Jr.

After accepting the School of Law Centennial Committee's invitation to speak
briefly about the history of the School, I had two rather disturbing thoughts. First, I
wondered how I could condense one hundred years of history into ten minutes.
Second, and even more disconcerting, I realized that my association with the School
of Law has spanned more than one-third of that century. When I mentioned my
concerns to a friend, he quipped that I might borrow from Coleridge and entitle my
address, "The Crime of the Ancient Barrister." The crime, he said, would be the Procrustean mayhem necessary to 'fit a century of history into the allotted time; the rest of
the title, he added, would need no explanation.

The First Century of the School of Law at Valparaiso University

Valparaiso University's
tradition tells us that
Oliver Wendell Holmes's
admonition to teach law
in the grand manner and
make great lawyers is
not enough for us.
To fulfill the destiny
of this University, we
must cherish the final
consonance of the study
of law and theologyand the consonance of
the freedom which is
under the law and the
freedom and responsibility
found in the Gospel
of Jesus Christ.

Louis F. Bartelt, Jr.
earned his A.B. and JD.
from Valparaiso University
and his LLM from Yale
University as a Sterling
Fellow. A member of the
State Bar of Wisconsin,
Mr. Bartelt has also been a
Rockefeller Research Fellow
at the University of Wtsconsin.
He has taught in the School
of Law at Valparaiso University
since 1948 and served the
School as dean from 1964-1969.
This address was delivered in
the Chapel of the Resurrection
at Valparaiso University
on April4, 1979, at ceremonies
opening the centennial year
celebrations of the School
16

As Valparaiso University celebrates the one hundredth anniversary of the founding
of its School of Law, American legal education coincidentally observes the bicentennial
of its modest beginnings- the first chair of law occupied in 1779 by George Wythe at
the College of William and Mary. A few other institutions followed its example.
Widespread dissatisfaction with the quality of the bar two hundred years ago
prompted these limited responses from the academic community and also persuaded
government to establish requirements for admission to the bar. In 1800, fourteen of
the nineteen states prescribed a definite period of preparation. These efforts to
improve the profession were swept away in the wake of Jacksonian democracy. Its
adherents distrusted forma·! education and had little patience with bar admission requirements. By 1860, only nine of thirty-nine states had such requirements.
A reflection of this prevailing attitude appears in the Indiana Constitution of 1850
which provided that "Every person of good moral character, being a voter, shall be
entitled to admission to practice law in all courts of justice." Incredibly, this provision
remained part of the Constitution until1932.
But there were a few signs, even before the Civil War, of renewed interest in
academic preparation for legal practice, and the post-war generation of lawyers,
more vocal and more unified, pressed for improvement in the quality of the bar
through formal legal education. One result was a proliferation of law schools
throughout the United States.
Indiana was no exception. In 1842, Indiana University established a chair of law,
probably the beginning of formal legal education in the state. About a dozen Indiana
law schools came into existence before the end of the century and four have survived.
One that did not survive was the law school of Asbury College (later DePauw
University), which operated sporadically between 1853 and 1894. Among the first six
Asbury law graduates in 1855 was Mark Lindsay DeMotte who, a quarter of a century
later, would establish the School of Law that has enjoyed uninterrupted existence in
Valparaiso, Indiana, since he delivered the inaugural address on November 11, 1879.
A bulletin of the Northern Indiana Normal School (now Valparaiso University) for
the 1879 session announced the establishment of a complete two-year course in law.
An 1880 bulletin states that the department, fully established, is in charge of Mark L.
DeMotte and the Honorable H.A. Gillett. By enrollment standards of the day, the
School of Law got off to a good start. There were about eighteen juniors and one
senior, John A. Whitmore, who had the distinction of being the first graduate of the
law school in 1880.
Even for the times, Valparaiso offered a legal education at bargain-basement
prices. Tuition for each ten-week term (initially, there were three) was $10 for juniors;
$13 for seniors. Eighty-five dollars covered tuition, room, and board for thirty weeks.
The early curriculum appears austere, but similar to offerings of other then contemporary law schools, and courses were added from time to time. Two instructors
and an occasional part-time lecturer taught the entire curriculum. In keeping with
the philosophy of the Normal School, any person of good moral character could
enroll in the law department's junior class. Initially, classes were held in a room in the
old College building, the present-day site of Founders' Rock on the South Campus of
Valparaiso University. In 1888, DeMotte bought a house on Greenwich Street which
he remodeled for law school use.
The Cresset

The study of law became popular. In 1893. the Chicago Tribune reported that two
young men attempted to rob the Northern Indiana Normal School. The motive,
according to defense counsel, was to garner sufficient funds to attend law classes.
They had, he said, "an overmastering thirst for learning, and anxiety to break into the
legal profession without loss of time." The judge was apparently unimpressed with
the defense counsel and sentenced the young men to prison for three years.
The School of Law progressed. In 1890, DeMotte added a fourth ten-week term to
the academic year and, by the turn of the century, had extended it to fifty weeks. Most
three-year law schools had academic calendars of thirty-six weeks. The School's
catalogue boasted that students would receive more than the equivalent of three
years' study in two years and a half at Valparaiso. (It said nothing about treatment for
extreme exhaustion.) By the end of the century, when enrollment leveled off at 150
students, the School of Law was the largest in the state.

The Paper Chase Near the Turn of the Century
A new era began in 1907 when Milo Jesse Bowman became dean. Bowman shortefled
the academic year to four terms of ten weeks each. The only holiday was Christmas
Day! The catalogue states that the two-year course encompassed 1,200 hours of
instruction, more than the Association of American Law Schools-all three-year
schools-required of its member schools.
From the beginning of the Bowman era, the School of Law begins to take on the
appearance of a modern-day institution. This is not to say that the school under
DeMotte's direction was inferior. It probably was as good as most and better than
many. By 1910, no fewer than ten graduates had become chief justices of their
respective states. Others became governors; still others United States Senators, including the late, great George Norris of Nebraska. Green Hackworth, the first
American to be appointed to the International Court of Justice and author of an eightOctober, 1979

The Old College Building
on College Avenue, circa 1895.
The original home of the
School of Law was the south
addition to the west wing
of the old College Building,
built in 1860 and destroyed
by fire in 1923.
Toward the turn of the
century, the founding dean
of the School of Law,
Colonel Mark L. DeMotte,
purchased a private home
at 355 Greenwich Street
from Professor Felix Ecblad,
the former head of the fine
arts department of the
University. This bu£/ding
(see front cover) remained
the home of the School
of Law until the early
days of the Lutheran
administration of the
University.
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An early classroom
of the School of Law,
circa 1895.
Although the Northern Indiana
Law School did not become
officially part of Valparaiso
University until1906 or 1907,
the early classes of the School
met in rooms of the Old College
Building of the University from
its earliest days. Dean DeMotte
was from a distinguished
pioneer family of clergymen
and educators of French
descen~ and he was senior
partner in one of the most
respected northwestern Indiana
law firms when, in 1879, he
founded the School of Law.
Shortly thereafter, he was
elected tb Congress and
served one term, after which
he returned to Valparaiso
and directed the School
until his death in 1908.
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volume treatise on international law, was a graduate of that era. And a footnote: one
of DeMotte's students still lives-the oldest member of the Illinois Bar.
But legal education was changing, and the School of Law adapted to that change.
Courses such as the History of England, English Constitutional History, Political
Economy, and Sociology appear. Bowman introduced the case study method; his
blending of the practical-the moot courts-with the theoretical presaged contemporary legal education. Students ~arne from all areas of the United States and from
nineteen foreign countries and gave the school a cosmopolitan profile.
Following the trend in legal education (and perhaps because student attrition was
phenomenal-at times more than 50 per cent), the school continued to raise its
admission standards. Before 1920, applicants had to have a high school education or
its equivalent.
In 1917, Bowman expanded the program to three years of thirty-six weeks each to
bring it into conformity with accrediting association standards. At the same time, he
instituted the Arts-Law program in which students could earn the Bachelor of Arts
and Bachelor of Law degrees in six years, and that program remained in effect for a
half-century.

The Lutherans and High Hopes Through Hard Tim es
The First World War, the death of University President Henry Baker Brown, and
the failure of the University to adapt to the changing climate and philosophy of
higher education in the 1920s spelled serious trouble for the School of Law. In 1917
there were fifty law graduates; in 1923, only nine.
In the mid-1920s, the recently-formed Lutheran University Association purchased
an almost defunct University and with uncommon determination sought the accredi-
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tation of the North Central Association of Colleges and Universities. To achieve that
objective, each degree program of the University had to be accredited by the
appropriate accrediting associations. Consequently, the School of Law conformed to
existing standards and announced that henceforth two years of college credit would
be required for admission. The financial pinch of those early Lutheran years is
evident from the catalogue. In the recent past, the full-time faculty had been
augmented by part-time instructors. Now Dean Bowman and Professors Virgil Berry
and John W; Morland taught the entire curriculum.
Among the nineteen law graduates of 1927 was Margaret Donna Doran. In the
early 1950s she began an association with the School of Law that spanned a score of
years; "Peg" served four deans as administrative assistant and was known fondly as
the unofficial dean of the School of Law.
Dean Bowman resigned in 1928; his successor was John W. Morland. Someone once
said that Bowman brought intellectual respectability to the School of Law and
Morland, academic respectability. Morland's selfless expenditure of time and effort
culminated in the American Bar Association's approval of the School in 1929, and,
within a year-a surprisingly short time-membership in the Association of American
Law Schools. Evidence of his diligence and thoroughness is the School's successful
acceptance upon first application to each organization, a feat not always accomplished
by other schools.
School enrollment figures in the late 1920s are frightening. First-year classes did
not exceed five; total enrollment dipped to nineteen. The downward trend, reversed
for a while, was followed by another decline, and by the beginning of World War II,
the student body numbered only twenty-five.
The Second World War years produced a remarkable chapter in the history of the
School of Law. Total enrollment reached its nadir in 1943 when four students
registered. There was serious talk of closing down the school-for obvious reasons.
October, 1979

Alumni Reunion
at President Brown's
home, circa 1900.
The gentlemen seated in the
front row are (left) Oliver
Perry Kinsey and (righ~ with
his daughter on his knee)
Henry Baker Brown, the
co-owners and entrepreneurs
of Valparaiso University
at the turn of the century.
Standing to the far right
front is Dean DeMotte.
Shortly before his death
in 1908, he transferred his
interest in the School of Law
to the firm of Brown and
Kinsey and retired from the
·deanship. The Brown home,
now a century old Valparaiso,
Indiana, landmark, is presently
the White House Restaurant
and continues to be a place
for School of Law alumni
reumons.
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However, the faith and persistance of the Business Manager of the University, Albert
Scribner, and particularly of President O.P. Kretzmann, saved the school from almost
certain extinction. The return of the war veterans ended the student drought for a
time, and enrollment reached another peak of 158 in 1949. But as the large numbers of
veterans-here and elsewhere-were graduated and entered the profession, lawrelated employment became scarce and students looked to other professions. The
School of Law enrollment reflected this shift and began a rapid decline. By 1952 it had
dropped below one hundred students, and the enrollment would not exceed that
figure again for a dozen years.
Morland resigned his deanship of twenty-six years in 1954, and Knute D. Stalland
assumed the office in 1955. (During the year's interim, President Kretzmann served as
acting dean, assisted by a faculty committee.) After a periodic inspection by the
American Bar Association, Dean Stalland used non-confidential parts of its report in
a speech to the local Rotarians. He told them that although the report was complimentary in many respects, it depicted the physical facilities as among the worst in
the country. Students and faculty of the era agreed.
In light of the small enrollment and steadily climbing costs, practicalists advised
against a large capital expenditure for so small and expensive an operation with an
uncertain future. Again, there were rumors of closing the School of Law, but the
vision and persuasive voice of President Kretzmann prevailed once more. On Whitsunday, June 10, 1962, a ground breaking ceremony for Wesemann Hall began the last
phase of the School of Law's first century.
Dean Stalland, a faculty of seven, and eighty-five students, all delighted but a bit
awed by the comparative luxury and spaciousness of the new building, occupied
Wesemann Hall in September, 1963. Its dedication the following spring was an
auspicious occasion. Among the distinguished guests were Chief Justice Earl Warren,
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Congressman Charles Halleck, The Rev. Dr. Oliver
Harms, the President of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, and Mrs. Janette
Wesemann, our generous benefactor. The ceremonies extended over three days.
Appropriately for a church-related institution, there were several conferences on
law and theology during the Stalland administration. A professor of philosophy from
the former Concordia Senior College in Fort Wayne was one of two discussants at the
first of these conferences in 1960. His name is Robert V. Schnabel, the present
President of the University.
Having achieved his major objective-the building of Wesemann Hall-Dean
Stalland retired from the office in 1964. Your speaker succeeded him in the Deanship
for a five-year tenure. During this period, a small group of very bright, highlymotivated, and immensely energetic students founded the Valparaiso University Law
Review. One member of that first editorial board is now our colleague, Professor
Bruce Berner.

The School Not Only Distinguished S,ut Distinctive
Alfred W. Meyer succeeded me as dean. When I left the decanal office in 1969, the
enrollment was 155; three years later it was a startling 349, more than twice that of any
year in the School's history. Although the School of Law suffered from growing pains
during the unanticipated inundation of students, it became stronger overall than it
ever had been. The composition of classes since 1970 has been very different from
earlier years, when there were few women and minority students. They now comprise
a substantial percentage of the student body.
In recent years, the Law Review, which had published two issues annually from its
inception, added a third to each volume, and the Student Bar Association began
publication of a law school newspaper, The Forum.
After the School of Law required a baccalaureate degree for admission, the
University awarded graduates the Juris Doctor in lieu of the Bachelor of Laws. A few
years later, at another gala event, the University conferred the J.D. retroactively on
all alumni-provided, of course, they paid thirty-five dollars for the substitution.
20

DeMotte Hall, circa 1950.
The newest building on the
campus at the time of the
Lutheran purchase of the
University in 1925 was the
Domestic Science Building,
which also then housed the
Commerce Department and the
Teacher's College. In the
early years of the Lutheran
administration, the School of
Law was moved into this
building where it remained
until1963 when it was moved
to its present location in
Wesemann Hall (see inside
front cover). In 1959,
during the Centennial of the
University, the building was
renamed DeMotte Hall in honor
of the founding dean of the
School of Law. At the time
of the Lutheran purchase of
the University in 1925,
DeMotte 's immediate successor
in the deanship, Milo Jesse
Bowman, was also serving the
University as Vice-Presiden~
having served briefly as
President in 1922. Dean
Bowman played a major role
in the struggle to keep the
University of Brown and Kinsey
intact until a new purchaser
could be found for it after
Brown's death He served
the School of Law as Dean
from 1907 to 1928, when he
joined the faculty of the
Indiana University School
of law. Years later, after
his retirement from the
Indiana faculty, Dean Bowman
returned to DeMotte Hall
to spend his last years
as a member of the faculty
of the School of Law
of Valparaiso University.
The Cresset acknowledges with
gratitude the assistance of
Mel Doering of the University
News Bureau and Professor
Richard Pick of the Speech
and Drama Department in
securing the photographs
used throughout this issue.
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I would be remiss if I did not call attention to a small group of colleagues, past and
present, who saw the vision and caught the spirit of the institution, and, by choice,
dedicated most, if not all, of their professional careers-often at great personal sacrifice-to the fulfillment of its purposes. They are: Virgil Berry, deceased; Marshall
Jox, deceased; James Savage, retired; Charles Gromley; Jack Hiller; and Richard
Stevenson. Present-day colleagues of shorter tenure evince the same sensitivity, the
same concern, the same dedication.
On July first of the School of Law's 98th year, Charles A. Ehren, Jr. became its
seventh dean, and it has fallen to him to lead the School of Law into its second century.
The years ahead will not be easy. But Dean Ehren demonstrates not only a strong
commitment to excellence and a tremendous capacit) for work toward that end, but
also a refreshing optimism and unswerving confidence about the future of the School
of Law. This bodes well for us as we stand at the threshold of our second century. As
we pause for our centennial celebration, it might be well for us to speak-whence has
the School of Law come and whither does it go ?
Valparaiso University's tradition tells us that Oliver Wendell Holmes's admonition
to teach law in the grand manner and make great lawyers- the path to a distinguished
law school-is not enough for us. We must strive for this, of course. But to fulfill the
destiny of this University, we must also cherish the consonance of the study of law and
theology-and the consonance of that freedom which is under the law and that
freedom and responsibility found in the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Our.path is not only
to a distinguished School of taw but also to a distinctive School of Law.
Fifteen years ago, President Emeritus Albert G. Huegli wrote that law "faculty and
students should be continually aware of their special responsibility as part of a
Christian University to give guidance and instruction .. . to future lawyers who live
out their lives in the shadow and commitment to the Cross."
The prophet Micah sums it up for us: "And what doth the Lord require of thee, but
to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?"
October, 1979
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for our centennial
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second century,
our path is not
only to a
distinguished
School of Law
but also to a
distinctive
School of Law.
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From
The Chapel
Job's Day in Court:
The Whirlwind
And the Cross
fob 38:1-7
I Corinthians 1:18-25

Marcus Riedel

God says Job is quite
right to argue as he does
in principle about justice.
It's just that good as he is
as a lawyer, he doesn't meet
the criteria for World-maker.
If you own something,
you have a unique claim
to it, a property right,
as lawyers say. But no
one may lay a claim

against the World-Maker
on those grounds.

Marcus Riedel is Professor of Philosophy
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honors program in the humanities at
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on General Education Models, a venture
sponsored by the Society for Values
in Higher Education. The GEM Project
is the effort of a consortium including
Valparaiso University and thirteen other
colleges and universJ'ties to revJ'talize
liberal education and restrain its further
diversion from its purpose by overdepartmentalization, over-professionalization,
and the deterioration of the humane context
on campuses for general studies.
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You no doubt recall the story of T):le Book of Job, how God
permits great suffering to befall him in spite of the fact
that Job was a righteous man. His flocks and herds and fields
are destroyed. His sons and daughters are killed. Finally,
his own body is struck with suppurating boils.
In his pain, three friends come-ostensibly to comfort him.
As it turns out, after Job's protestations of innocence, they
accuse him of unrighteousness on the ground that suffering
is punishment for sin.Job must be unrighteous, for God is just
and retributes punishment for sin and prosperity for righteousness.
Job appeals to God. He asserts that he is innocent-and that
if this is the way the innocent are treated, there's no
advantage to being faithful to God. He asserts than even if
he has done anything wrong, it couldn't amount to much before
God who is too infinitely beyond men to be concerned with men's
peccadilloes. He asserts that even if God thought He had to
punish him for youthful waywardness, He might at least have made
the punishment fit the crime-and thus not have wiped out Job's
family line and made his life so wretched he'd be better off dead.
He appeals to God for an explanation and a hearing, certain
of the fact that he'll be able to convince God that it's simply
unreasonable of him to treat the innocent this way.
After a time during which Job begins to think that heaven
is deaf and voiceless and that he is alone in an uncaring
universe, God does speak to him out of a whirlwind.
One of the interesting things about God's speech to Job
is that it appears, in one commentator's words, to be
"magnificently irrelevant." God never gives Job an
explanation for suffering. In fact, He appears to
compound the trouble by admitting that Job is innocenta righteous man who has spoken rightly of God.
But to a philosopher another interesting point lies
in the fact that God does not deny any of the bases
on which Job might press moral claims against him.
He doesn't deny that Job is innocent. He doesn't deny
that retribution for sin would be reason for making
someone suffer. He doesn't deny that He ought to be reasonable,
nor that there is moral harmony in the universe, nor that
property rights confer certain just claims on their possessors.
In fact, in His questions to Job, He implies affirmative
answers to all these. The upshot seems to be that He says
that Job is quite right to argue as he does in principle
about justice; it's just that good as he is as a lawyer,
he doesn't meet the criteria for World-maker.
To claim a right to dispense justice in the world and to make
things better than they are, as Job really does when he says
he'd do a better job than God, means first of all to have
the power to contain the forces at work in the world.
One must be able to bind the chains of the Pleiades and loose
the cords of Orion, to play with the mighty Leviathan and
the fearsome wild water buffalo as little toys.
It means, to stand, an equal with God.
The Cresset

But God says to Job, "Who is he that can stand before me?" When all this is said, what have we from The Book of Job
in the way of an answer to the problem of innocent
To claim a right to regulate the advent of pleasure and
suffering? We don't get an explanation why people
pain in the world, to determine whether suffering should
suffer. In fact, God's challenge is that we couldn't
understand the answer if He gave it. It is made clear
come to anyone or to whom it should come, requires
more than power. It requires a basis for the claim of right,
that there is an answer. God shows that he made things
and it requires wisdom to direct the forces so that they
as he did on purpose and that in spite of appearances
make up a world-an ordered system and not a
He is in command of the forces that cause suffering.
seething chaos in which nothing has place or status.
But I think you have to say this is still unsatisfactory.
To be sure, Job claims that he never questioned God's
So God constrains the forces at work! So God has a great
right to rule. He may be a bit confused about that,
purpose in mind! What is that purpose to me? Is my
though, since he does claim God's rule is unjust;
happiness a part of His plan? How can I bear the pain
it's difficult to see how there could be a standard
of my existence now? Job said his life wasn't worth
of justice which was external and prior to the Worldliving with the loss he had to bear, and more than one
maker to which He need of right conform. In any case,
person now alive can say the same.
God alludes to a couple of the ordinary bases of a claim
of right. If someone has given you something, you often
There is an answer in The Book of Job. It is that Job's
owe something in return. If you own something, you have cries did not fall on deaf ears and that when his three
a unique claim to it, a property right, as lawyers say.
comforters did not comfort him the World-maker talked
But no one may lay a claim against God on either of
to him face to face. That Mighty Power cared so much
those grounds. "Who has given to me that I should repay
for his pain that He spoke personally to Job and shared
him? Whatever is under the whole heaven in mine."
His own problems with him. As a person He accepted Job
as a person and then sent him to help his friends in
So the only remaining bases for a claim that I can see,
their distress. The answer thus seems to be that
given my perspective from the history of philosophy, is
suffering is necessary in God's creative purpose and
that a human being shouldn't be made to suffer as Job
that though we can't understand it, we can not only
suffers because he has the dignity of a human person,
survive it, but bear up under it if we are present
or that the whole business was badly put together from
to each other as God is present to us in compassion.
a u~ilitarian view of misery and happiness.
Unfortunately, to make either of those claims requires
knowledge of a staggering order of magnitude: both of
the possible systematic orders of arrangement of things
and of their detailed operation. First of all, you
can't say a person has caused you evil unless he causes
you pain from a malevolent or, at least, a capricious
will toward you. He must treat you as if your will
were of no account in the matter. Short of attributing
ill will to God, Job can only claim that God either has
not taken proper account of his status as a human being
or that He's too dull-witted to make things come out right.
But the status of anything in the universe can only be
told in relation to all the other things in the universe,
and whether everything in the end works out best for one
or all requires that we know the end for each and all.
In response to any such claim on Job's part or mine,
God rightly says: "Where were you when I made all this?"
Have you probed the depths of the sea and understood
what is there? Do you know the ordinances of the
heavens? Do you know why I gave reason to man but
withheld wisdom from the ostrich? Is it by your
wisdom that the eagle soars to the heaven and dives
for prey for his young ones who also suck blood?
Is it by your understanding that the rose yields
its fragance and a drop of dew on its unfolding
bud mirrors, sparkling, a whole world?
"He who argues with God, let him answer it." Neither
you nor I have what it takes to make the claim.
October, 1979

Your A rm's Too Short To Box With God
Now if we can read fob together with First Corinthians,
we can amplify the answer. In the Christ crucified
that we Christians preach, God again appears with an
alternative to retributive punishment as the reward
even of our guilt. The alternative is not only that
He comes to us in the person of Christ, but that He
suffers with our human lot and for us, taking the
retribution upon Himself and showing us how to help
others in their.distress.
As Job thought it was unreasonable of God to treat
him so harshly in his innocence and to meet his
outbursts for so long with blank walls of silence,
and as Job was sure he knew what a reasonable
God would do, so we often don't accept His answer.
because inside us there's something that's sure
that it would be unreasonable for God to be a man
and that it would be foolish to think He could care
so much for our happiness that He would suffer for us.
Like the Jews, we, with Job, demand signs. Like
the Greeks, we, with Job, seek wisdom. But the
foolishness of God is wiser than men. He hangs
on a cross for us, and He says: "Come, I am here
for you who suffer and are heavy laden."
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For many
observers the
turmoil of the
seventies
represents a
civilizational
crisis. When
civilization
is in crisis,
religion and
law are deeply
implicated.
"Death of God"
talk has been
matched by the
"Death of the
law," visible
to those who
will look at
the shambles of
our legal system,
ever-mounting
crime rates, and
the contempt
with which the
legal process
is treated by
millions of
Americans- rich
and poor,
officials,
outcasts,
and ordinary
citizens. Many
of the issues
with which the
legal process
must deal
seldom lend
themselves
strictly to
legal solution,
for they
involve
considerations
of public policy,
social purpose,
moral judgment,
and religious
insight.
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New
Occasions
Teach
New
Duties

Richard P. Baepler

Fresh
Encounters
Of Law
with Theology

In 1974 the American Association of Law
Schools established a section on Law and Religion which has attracted a great deal of
interest in its scholarly presentation by legal
and theological scholars at the annual meetings of the association. In the spring of 1977,
the deans of the Law School and the Divinity
School of Harvard University convened a
major symposium on the theme "Theology
and Law : Responsibilities of Vocation." At
the conclusion of the conference, the Council
on Religion and Law (CORAL) was formed;
in two years its membership has grown to
over nine hundred.
The Harvard symposium was a response to
an exhaustive report drawn up by Harvard
divinity and law student Frank Alexander,
who documented the number and kinds of
programs already underway involving jurists
and religious professionals. Fourteen law
schools were found to be offering courses or
interdisciplinary programs dealing with the
interaction of law and religion. Four theological schools had created joint degree programs with law schools. Two forJ;llal clinical
programs had been established, allowing students in law and in theology to benefit directly
from insights and skills derived from clinical
collaboration. Finally, a bibliographical study
revealed that a substantial body of literaturefifty-five articles and books dealing with the
interrelationships among religion, ethics, and
the law-appeared in the 1970-1975 period
examined by Alexander.
Reasons for this surge of interest are not
difficult to find. For many observers the turmoil of the sixties and seventies represents a
civilizational crisis. When civilization is in
Richard P. Baepler studied church history and
law at the Divinity School and the School ofLaw of
the University of Chicago and is Professor of Theology and Law at Valparaiso University. Having
served the past decade as Dean of Christ College,
the University 's interdisciplinary honors program
in the humanities, Mr. Baepler this year assumed
the office of Vice-President for Academic Affairs.
The Cresset is grateful to Vice-President Baepler
for his special assistance in securing several of the
articles in this issue celebrating the centennial of
the School of Law at Valparaiso University.

crisis, religion and law are implicated deeply.
"Death of God" talk has been matched by
Judge Lois Forer's Death of the Law, in which
she writes :
The death of the law is visible to those who will look at
the shambles of our legal system, the ever-mounting
crime rate, and the contempt with which the legal
process is treated by millions of Americans-rich and
poor, officials, outcasts, and ordinary citizens.

Furthermore, many of the issues under
public discussion today, with which the legal
process must deal, seldom lend themselves
strictly to legal analysis and solution for they
involve considerations of public policy, social
purpose, moral judgment, and religious insight.
Finally, there is the "legal explosion," the
enormous increase in the number of lawyers
active in a very complex society. This is related to the remarkable increase in legal rights
and entitlements in recent years and the still
growing involvement of government in our
lives. For example, there was a 33 per cent
increase in the size of the Code of Federal
Regulations and a 201 per cent increase in the
Federal Register from 1970 to 1975. What is
frequently forgotten, but now slowly being
recognized, is how equally pervasive and dynamic is the religious dimension of American
life. Despite all the talk about a post-Christian
age, the churches in America form the largest
associational network in the country, and
more people may be found in the churches
and synagogues of the country on a given
weekend than in attendance at professional
sporting events in an entire year. Churches
are, among other things, value-generating
and value-catalyzing associations, and they
significantly shape the ethos in which the legal
process operates and on which it depends.
This intimate association between law and
religion is deeply rooted in Western culture.
The competition between lawyers and
preachers for shaping society is very old.
Many a lawyer started out to be a preacher
and vice versa. The papal revolution of the
high Middle Ages was carried out by the great
lawyer-popes and the church was increasingly
administered by lawyers as it fashioned an
international system of justice, which in turn
came to be emulated and borrowed by secular
leaders who competed in offering their subjects justice at least as good as that available at
the church courts. The phrase " a good jurist
is a bad Christian" is commonplace dating at
least from the thirteenth century, reflecting
the rivalry of two classes of men trying to
shape society. The religious order tended to
view society from the standpoint of eternity,
The Cresset

shaping refractory human wills to conform
with a distinct vision of justice, defining social
values by final ends. The legal order, increasingly important in direct relation to the
growth of institutional and social complexity,
was centered in this world, on the frontier
between order and chaos, aiming at pragmatic
solutions in a world of conflict, seeking to
make the world tolerable through manageable
principles which had little to do with absolute
justice. Luther and Calvin were both lawyers
turned theologians, and an interesting part of
the Reformation story is their love-hate relationship with the lawyers with whom they
worked intimately in the reconstruction of
church and society.
Early American history is particularly interesting from this standpoint. Many of the
colonies banned lawyers, envisioning a simple
justice administered by lay magistrates, unencumbered by technical pleadings and legal
sleight of hand. Often society was in fact very
much run by clerical leaders, or leaders much
under the influence of clerics. At the beginning of the Republic, lawyers having once
again become influential, many a young evangelical seriously debated whether or not he
should be a minister or a lawyer. Many a man
easily slid from one career to another, hoping
to help establish a godly commonwealth in
which politics and law would be channels for
achieving evangelical goals, especially the
creation of a benevolent society bound together by Christian love. As it turned out,
neither ministers nor lawyers came to shape
the new country but, it has been argued, both
came to be servants or powerful forces which
led to the development of a business society,
all too often offering dubious legitimation for
the goals of that society.
Anglo-American jurisprudence in the late
eighteenth century regarded positive law as
an extension of divine law, available through
reason and revelation. Just as American communities were bound together by common
religious dogma, so American intellectual life
in the antebellum nineteenth century shared
a common Christian providential interpretation of the world. This interpretation with
its rather neat positioning of law and divine
revelation was particularly well-suited to a
relatively static view of things. By the time of
the Civil War, that static order was crumbling
under the impact of industrial and intellectual
change.
These pervasive changes brought new realities to the force, realities which struck the observer as tumultuous and atomistic, without
October, 1979

sense and order. Old social patterns were
destroyed by the forces growing out of industrialism, urban development, technological invention and scientific findings. Old categories did not fit the new realities. The struggle to find new patterns of order, to account
for the new scientific knowledge and new
social arrangements was reflected in the rise
of pragmatism and Darwinian social thought.
The most notable American legal figure at
the center of these developments was Oliver
Wendell Holmes. In his effort to make sense
of the logic of the law as the courts were in
fact interpreting and making it in response to
change, he rejected all views which held law
to be deduced in some way from a set of
principles of ethics. Law was rather to be
learned from studying the decisions of the
courts as they responded to social experience
and necessity. When Christopher Columbus
Langdell established the case method at Harvard in 1870, in which law was studied "scientifically" through the analysis of key cases
through which the ordering concepts of law
could be ascertained, legal education had
become fully secularized in the sense of its
subject matter being removed from ethical,
moral, or religious frames of reference.
A somewhat parallel development in Europe, resulting in the detachment of the law
from its older natural law or religious moorings in the nineteenth century, makes it possible for some scholars to talk about a crisis in
the whole Western legal tradition. When law
loses its communal or consensual basis, becoming a mere mechanical or bureaucratic
function , it loses its vitality and genuine life.
Nowhere was this crisis more clearly revealed
than in Nazi Germany, where the legal order
not only failed to prevent a gross perversion
of justice but itself became the legitimizing
tool of gross injustice.
The most serious consideration of the relation of Christian faith to the law took place
in Protestant and Catholic theological circles
during the Third Reich and immediately
following the War in a series of studies sponsored by the World Council of Churches.
Since it was apparent that the legal order was
defenseless and had no power within itself to
reorder itself, the question arose concerning
the church's responsibility to take up the cause
of justice beyond its own doors for the sake of
society. To do this, it had to consider its own
life and the foundations of its understanding
of the world and, of course, the law.
Among European Catholic theologians and
jurists, a long tradition of natural law was
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What is it that
the Christian
lawyer asks of
the theologian?
He is seeking
primarily for
help in dealing
articulately
with a pervasive
legal-ethical
philosophy
which he senses
is inconsistent
with Christianity.
This is the
philosophy of
legal positivism
(which attempts
to insulate law
from morals) and
ethical
relativism
(which reduces
morals to a
matter of
personal
opinion and
cultural
history).
The lawyer
Christian
rejects this
position; he
knows that law
is not merely
, a means by
which the
powerful impose
their wills
upon the rest
of humankind.
But he runs
into difficulty
when he looks
for satisfactory
terms in which
to declare his
belief in the
moral foundations
of the law.
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revived, especially under the inspiration of
the leading neo-Thomist, Joseph Marechal,
and his post-Kantian critical Thomism.
Protestants developed two major lines of
thought. Lutherans, especially in the Erlangen tradition, found the foundations of valid
law in the divinely established order of life,
called order of creation or preservation. In
many respects, this development resembles
natural law thought, though there is more of
an effort to acknowledge dynamic and developing elements in the orders of creation.
The other influential development in Protestant thought came from theologians and jurists who followed the christological theology
of Karl Barth. Repudiating anything like
natural law or natural orders, this theology
attempts to understand all reality, including
the reality of law, as rendered intelligible
only by a Biblical understanding of the work
of God in the world made definitively clear
by the revelation in Jesus Christ.
After the War the work of these men continued, especially under the auspices of the
World Council of Churches. Major conferences on the subject were held in Treysa
(Germany) in 1950, and the resulting papers
constitute something of a landmark in the
church's thought on this subject.
In the immediate post-war period European thought was mediated to American readers by two important translations. The Lutheran viewpoint was expressed by Swedish
Bishop Gustav Aulen's magnificent Church,
Law and Society . In a wide-ranging discussion
of the modern cultural and social situation
-and the place of the Church in society, he engaged in a criticism of the Church and in a
call for a more comprehensive understanding
of the role of law in society against the background of a dramatic understanding of history in which creative and destructive forces
clash. The book is especially notable for its
positive interpretation of the sympathetic Lutheran understanding of secularity in the
modern context. The point of view generally
associated with the circle of theologians close
to Karl Barth was represented in Jacques
Ellul's The Theolog"~·cal Foundatt"on of the Law.
Ellul, a well-known French legal scholar and
lay theologian, has recently become wellknown in this country for his social and cultural criticism.
While European Christian thought was
shaped by the crisis of the Third Reich, American thought, sharing some of the impulses
from Europe, seemed to be more of an extension of a general concern for social ethics.

The Niebuhr brothers towered over other
Americans and gave a good deal of attention
to the topics of justice and law. Paul Ramsey
of Princeton did a number of lectures at New
York University Law School in 1958 and expanded these into a series of studies on the
juristic thought of the Niebuhrs, Tillich,
Brunner, Maritain, and others, published as
Nt"ne Modern Moralt"sts.

In the mid-fifties, a group of organizations
of Christian faculty and students on university
campuses sponsored a conference on Christianity and Law in Whitinsville, Massachusetts. The papers were published in the Vanderb£/t Law Revt"ew. A larger national conference was held the next year at the University of Chicago featuring papers and addresses later published in the Oklahoma Law
Revt"ew.

Within Lutheran circles, Valparaiso University was the focal point of whatever development there was. In the late forties, President O .P. Kretzmann had organized the Social Ethics Seminar which gave impetus for
the formulation of a Lutheran social ethic in
the United States. Two conferences on law
and theology also met at the university, the
first jointly sponsored with the Lutheran
Academy of Scholarship and the second held
in connection with the dedication of the new
law school building in 1964. Each conference
produced a publication of papers which are
on every standard bibliography in the field.
In the sixties, evangelical Protestants
formed the Christian Legal Society and began
publication of The Christt"an Lawyer. At first
this journal represented a superficial fundamentalism emphasizing the contrast of modern relativism with revealed standards of
right and wrong, and calling for a recovery of
these standards. This was accompanied by
the call for such pieties as prayer groups,
Bible study sessions, and the creation of Christian law firms. More recently, the serious intellectual and theological ferment within evangelical circles has spilled over to the pages of
this journal and the result is much more
serious legal and theological writing, although a certain unevenness remains.
American Roman Catholics have maintained the largest church-connected network
of law schools and until very recently were
especially pre-occupied with church-state issues and with an elaboration of natural law
doctrine, particularly with respect to ethical
issues such as birth control and just-war
theory. Many law reviews emanate from these
schools. Perhaps the best come from the UniThe Cresset

versity of Notre Dame Law School which, in
addition to publishing the Notre Dame Lawyer, for years has published the Natural Law
Forum, and, since 1969, The American Journal
of Jurisprudence with an ecumenical orientation in the theology of law.
Over the past two decades there has been a
notable alteration in the issues which have
interested American Christian jurists and theologians. In the fifties, the dominat issue
tended to be theoretical questions of the normative foundations for law. Dean Wilbur Katz
of the University of Chicago Law School put
it this way:
What is it that the Christian lawyer asks of the the·
ologian? He is seeking primarily for help in dealing
articulately with a widely-held legal-ethical philosophy
which he senses is inconsistent with Christianity. This
is the philosophy of legal positivism (which attempts
to insulate law from morals) and ethical relativism
(which reduces morals to a matter of personal opinion
and cultural history). The lawyer Christian rejects this
position; he knows that law is not merely a means by
which the powerful impose their wills upon the re·
mainder of the community. He insists that criticism of
rules of law is not merely expression of subjective
preference ....
But the Christian lawyer runs into difficulty when he
looks for satisfactory terms in which to declare his
belief in the moral foundations of the law, when he
seeks for the meaning of objectivity in legal criticism
and for criteria in terms of which law may be criticized.

Natural law thought, especially as developed in Roman Catholic schools, clearly responded to these question. But even at the
hands of such a gifted theorjst as the late
Father John Courtney Murray, the responses
did not recommend themselves to Protestants
or, for that matter, to secularists. Such thought
depended too much on a particular metaphysic, contradicted a general Protestant pessimistic view of man's capacity to know and
do the right, and led to positions on such matters as birth control which seemed not to take
adequate account of history and moral experience. Protestants especially pointed to the
ambiguous history of natural law which has
been used to justify positions such as slavery
and Nazi ideology. Indeed, many Protestants,
especially those under Barthian neo-orthodox
influence, expressed an appreciation for positivism, not as an exhaustive statement of the
legal process but as a clear statement on how
the law in fact actually works. Nevertheless,
many Protestant thinkers, such as Reinhold
Niebuhr, finally produced what may properly
be called a modified theory of natural law
while at the same time repudiating traditional
natural law views.
The contemporary situation is qualified by
several new elements. The search for normative criteria by which positivism may be evalOctober, 1979

uated continues, and the natural law tradition
has shown a remarkable capacity for adaptation, taking into account personalist and critical philosophies which have appeared especially in Europe and in post-Vatican II
ecumenical theology. Recently, the former
dean of Notre Dame Law School, Tom Shaffer, wrote:
The fostering of ethical and religious concern among
lawyers might be thought to be a task which belonged,
long ago, to those who founded, maintained, and taught
in Christian university law schools. But most of the law
faculties at what were once thought to be the great
Protestant Christian universities appear uninterested
in their institutional heritage, if not ashamed of it. Law
faculties in Roman Catholic universities have rarely
passed beyond fruitless phrases about natural law,
which long ago became a banner rather than an idea,
and is now neither banner nor idea . . . . Christianity
has had too little to do with what is hopeful in the
American legal profession. I believe that a motivating
reason for that failure is our diffidence in talking
about religious commitment; when few talk about
religion, personal value is inaccessible and public style
becomes irreligious. Too many candles are under too
many bushels.

Shaffer published these remarks in 1975 in
an article in the Southern California Law Review
entitled, "Christian Theories of Professional
Responsibility." As he wrote, the new Section
on Law and Religion of the AALS, referred to
at the beginning of this article, was being
called together. At the same time, Professor
Harold Berman of the Harvard Law School
was writing The Interaction of Law and Religion,
sketching out problem areas for serious
scholarship. He himself is now in the process
of publishing a major study of the history of
Western legal tradition, in which he devotes a
great deal of impressive scholarship to the
theological sources of Western law and also to
·the problem of the secularization of law.
In 1976, a colleague of Shaffer's at Notre
Dame, Robert Rodes, Jr., published The Legal
Enterprise, the first American work on jurisprudence to speak of God since the early
nineteenth century. It is a serious effort to
write a theologically-informed work of jurisprudence. Natural law thought is present as a
way of talking about human dignity and fulfillment as a purpose and guide for legal development. The theological perspective and
this unobtrusive use of natural law combine
to give the book a refreshing quality. The
legal enterprise, as he explains it, is a particular way by which God keeps his promises
in Genesis not to abandon man but to continue
to be present to mankind in a particular way
and to let man live. Yet the enterprise is
limited and relative; it is not salvific. "The
promises it mediates do not exhaust man's
nee.ds or God's response to them."
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Our
rule-oriented
legal process
has produced
monsters
equally as
horrible as
when there is a
"sleep of rule."
Such monsters ·
are created
when the reality
of the human
person who is
acting and being
acted upon in
the legal
process is
neglected.
The adversary
system of
American law
imposes
particular
strains on the
traditional
moral feelings
of attorneys,
and they need
to find
resources
to resist
becoming
cynical,
manipulative,
·and tunnelvisioned.
Many lawyers
are now
realizing that,
like nearly
all helping
professionals,
they are illequipped to
deal with the
many dimensions
of their
clients'
problems.
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In a similar way, Professor John Noonan of
Berkeley, also a Roman Catholic personalist,
has recently published Persons and Masks of
the Law, a controversial work on legal history
exhibiting the ways by which our rule-oriented legal process has produced monsters
equally as horrible as when there is a "sleep of
rule." Such monsters are created when the
reality of the human person who is acting and
being acted upon in the legal process is neglected. He is searching for ways of reintroducing moral considerations in the legal process and in legal education, " . . . the moral
education essential to the professional preparation of lawyers who are to be formed less
as social engineers than as the charitable creators of values:" The book is a historical essay addressing what Noonan considers to be
the central problem of the legal system, the
relationship of love to power.
Among Protestant writers, two lawyer-theologians, the late James Pike and William
Stringfellow, produced a number of useful
works on particular social/legal issues. Presently, a new generation of theological ethicists, men such as David Little, James Childress, and Douglas Sturm, are addressing
themselves to very specific issues of jurisprudence and of ethical/legal concern.
Seminars and symposia on the law-religion
concern now appear frequently. Perhaps the
most impressive recent example is an issue of
the Hastings Law Journal, which brings together
an array of legal and theological scholars on a
broad range of topics, including W.D . Davies
on "Paul and the Law," Karl Hertz on "Luther and the Law," and Milton Konvitz on
"Conscience and Civil Disobedience in Jewish , Christian, and Greek and Roman
Thought."
An idea of the range of issues that fall under
the general umbrella of law and religion
might be gathered from papers written by six
students for this author in a seminar on the
subject at the School of Law of Valparaiso ·
University. One student attempted an interpretation or translation of Luther's legal
thought for pluralist modern America.
Another sought to document the alleged attempts to transform American society into a
secularist society under control of law and
contrary to the legal and religious traditions
of the nation. A third analyzed the gross legal
abuse and legal defenselessness involved in
deprogramming kidnapped members of cults
and the ser ious implications of this for religious freedom. Still another analyzed the
legal and theological problems involved in

property disputes within church bodies. A
fifth student canvassed black preachers to
clarify the religious and legal bases for their
involvement or noninvolvement in current
social movements, especially against the background of the church's very visible involvement in the earlier civil rights movement.
Finally, a student analyzed current developments in family law against the claim of John
Noonan that this law is seriously eroding the
privileged place traditionally given marriage
in our culture. This latter issue is an instance
. of a fascinating larger problem of the ways in
which the J udeo-Christian religion shaped
our culture and our morality , infused the law
with its values, and might now be undergoing
an unravelling or, at least, a reordering.
An interesting new area of considerable
importance is in the realm of the professional
responsibility and vocation of the lawyer. In
addition to the range of ethical issues which
are under debate presently, there are large
questions of the role and vision of the lawyer:
Is he a "hired gun" or can he also work from a
larger social and religious vision (though this
is by no means a problem exclusively for lawyers)? The adversary system of American law
imposes particular strains on the traditional
moral feelings of attorneys, and they need to
find resources to resist becoming cynical,
manipulative, and tunnel-visioned. Furthermore, many lawyers are now realizing that,
like nearly all helping professionals, they are
ill-equipped to deal with the many dimensions of their clients' problems. Because lawyers seem to have the keys to so many prob~
lems, people often bring problems to them
which are only minimally legal , a phenomenon that physicians and pastors also
face. Recognition of this fact is impelling the
professions to consider something of an interdisciplinary orientation to their work, and
the possible role of pastoral theology in this
connection is evident.
We have not even begun to touch on churchstate issues which have become more numerous and complicated than ever before. The
very definition of "religion" and "church," in
their legal and theological aspects, is unsettled . The traditional position of drawing a
clear distinction between religious belief (unlimited freedom allowed) and religious behavior (circumscribed by law) is increasingly
challenged by the churches on theological
grounds. The new role of the regulatory agencies and their relationship to the churches is
uncharted.
A lively decade lies ahead!
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The Nation

On the Liberty
To Govern
RichardT. Stith, Ill
Many of us- and our courts- speak
and write as if the sole constitutional
issue before the American people
today were between individual freedom and centralized regulation. But
both of these alternatives sacrifice
another kind of liberty-political liberty, the liberty to govern. In this brief
column I shall try to indicate the importance of this latter liberty, the
tension between it and both big government and individualistic liberty,
and a model of judicial supervision
which could preserve the legislative
autonomy of state, local, and family
communities.
Our usual bipolar analysis does not
permit political liberty- the liberty
to govern-to be accommodated or
even understood. For example, if an
FDA ban on laetrile is upheld by the
Richard T. Stith, III, holds his A .B.
from Harvard College and his JD. and
Ph.D. from Yale University . An Associate
Professor of Law at Valparaiso University, Mr. Stith excerpts this column from
remarks recently delivered at the Institute for Theolog'l:cal Encounter with Science and Technology. !TEST is an international, interdisciplinary, and interdenominational community of scholars
serving as an "early warning system" for
Christian churches on the progress of
science and ready to translate those developments into an ecclesial vocabulary
so that the ethical issues may be engaged
by the churches.
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courts, not only is individual liberty
diminished but so also is state and
local freedom to make moral and
medical judgments lessened. On the
other hand, if the right of privacy is
invoked to strike down the FDA regulation, state and local regulation
must likewise give way. Either way,
the self-governing autonomy of subnational communities disappears.
This loss matters. An isolated individual, however "free," is largely
powerless. And voluntary co-operation is not enough to let us build
communities conducive to the good
life. Unless we can mutually coerce
each other to achieve goals impossible for us as individuals, our hopes
and ideals will shrink or shatter on
the first selfish impulses to the contrary.
For example, how free are workers
in the presence of "right to work"
laws or court decisions? Even though
every worker may agree that a union
is an absolute necessity and may vote
to form one, it remains in the selfinterest of every worker to be a "free
rider" as long as he can get away with
it. As a result of the multiplication of
free riders, who know that their individual dues contribution would
have almost no effect on the power of
the union, the union may be disastrously weakened. Only if the workers
have some legal way to bind themselves individually to follow what is
in their agreed joint interest are they
truly free in the sense of being able to
do what they really want most-i.e.
to form a union.
I am not arguing that political liberty is the only significant kind of
liberty. Individualistic, private liberty is also important and should
perhaps sometimes have priority
over political liberty. For example, if
racism or some other ghettoizing deprives a certain class of persons of all
effective political power, court intervention might be appropriate. I am
only pointing out that, normally, the
forcible preservation of individualistic
liberty (e.g., to use laetrile or not to
join a union) also sacrifices another
liberty.
Morever, even the gains to individualistic liberty (as a result, say, of

Supreme Court intervention) may be
more apparent than real. The losing
side in a civil war no doubt temporarily feels liberated by the armies of
a giant neighbor which it has invited
in. But who will guard the guardians?
No one is able easily to govern the
Supreme Court; it is far less politically challengeable than the most
oppressive government. And it is no
less likely to be arbitrary than is a
conquering army.
For example, "privacy" and "compelling state interest" (key terms used
by the Court to strike down legislation today) are virtually whimsical
notions; they have almost no conceptual unity as used by the Court.
Consequently, they can be arbitrarily
used to extend and to limit personal
liberty according to the preferences
of the justices. For example, the same
case (Roe v. Wade) which granted
the private right to abortion also reaffirmed Buck v. Ben a decision which
upheld the right of the state coercively to sterilize the retarded. Protecting the unborn is not a compelling state interest but eliminating
those who "sap the strength of the
State" (in words of Justice Holmes,
writing in Buck) is a compelling interest. The way is clearly left open to
upholqing a law requiring, e.g., abortion of mon~oloid children.

An isolated individual,
however "free," is
largely powerless.
Voluntary co-operation
is not enough to let
us build communities
conducive to the good
life. We must be free
to coerce each other.
Nor does the fact that the Court
must in theory act only by striking
down laws provide a significant limit
on it, any more than the king in the
Book of Esther was limited. The
elimination of many mongoloids
might be accomplished, for example,
simply by declaring a private parental right to destroy newborns who
lack what someone else considers
"meaningful life" (in Roe's terms).
And equal protection arguments can
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Political liberty, therefore, is not
only important for its own sake; it is
also a guardian of personal liberty.
The short-run sacrifice of political
liberty for private freedom may, by
transferring power to a higher and
less controllable level, also lead in
the long run to the loss of both kinds
of liberty.
Everything I have said can be reduced to this: A motorcycle helmetrequirement law enacted by an open
town meeting is far less restrictive of
liberty as a whole than exactly the
same law imposed by a federal regulatory agency The two factors of
smallness (or immediacy) and democracy make the first as much an
exercise of liberty as a restriction of
it, whereas the second involves the
elimination of both private and political liberty. Consequently, I would
argue that all political, moral, and
legal analysis of government regulation is incomplete if the source of
such restrictions is not taken into account.
In terms of legal analysis, what is
needed is a doctrine which will give
more scope to legislative power the
more locally and/or democratically
it is exercised. First of all, Supreme
Court intervention ought to be minimized. But when it occurs, federal
regulations ought to be the most "suspect." Next, federal laws ought to be
more suspect than State laws. (I do
not see why the Fourteenth Amendment, which operates against the
States, has to be read as restrictively
as the Fifth and other Amendments
which operate against Congressgiven that the federal nature of our
government was not abolished by the
Civil War.) And state laws directly
regulating conduct ought to be more
suspect than state laws delegating
power to smaller units, such as municipalities, unions, or families.
If such a model of judicial supervision is followed, economic and
moral fashions may still in the end
dictate the sacrifice of political liberty. But at le(l.st this sacrifice will
have been made consciously, after
serious reflection, taking into account
the value of what is lost.
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Books

Life and Death
With Liberty
And Justice:
A Contribution
To The Euthanasia Debate
By Germain Prisez and Joseph M. Boyle,
Jr. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1979. Pp. xiii + 521.
Cloth, $20.00.

Euthanasia, or mercy killing, raises
agonizingly difficult ethical and legal
questions for us all. We all know that
it can mask a ruthless disregard for
the weak and helpless. Yet it also can
express a genuine concern to end
suffering. These two facts confuse
every moral judgment, and make
euthanasia highly resistant to confident ethical and political positioptaking. Who would feel comfortable
organizing support for the Quinlan
parents' right to cause their child's
death by withdrawing necessary life
supports? Who would be morally
able to organize opposition to such
removal? Who is even certain whether
or not such removal constitutes
euthanasia? I know of very few. The
profound and contradictory intuitions
we all feel make euthanasia so emotionally and intellectually complex
that we stand by morally paralyzed.
Prisez and Boyle's work is first,
but a giant, step toward ending that
paralysis. With astonishing and meticulous thoroughness, they analyze
and pull together all the complex
strands of the euthanasia debate. For
the first time, the debate begins to
make sense. And if the issues remain
too complex for easy militancy, at
least some moral, legal, and political judgments can be made with
greater confidence.

Perhaps even more significant than
what the book pulls together is what
it takes apart. The authors are able to
distinguish innumerable issues which
usually are confused: definition of
death, refusal of medical treatment,
suicide, homicide with consent of the
victim, non-voluntary euthanasia,
and proper care for the dyingamong others. And on every nuance
a bibliography is provided in the
footnotes. Indeed, so independent
are the chapters on each of these
topics that for the most part the book
can be treated simply as a reference
file, to be consulted on particular
points of interest.
For example, Chapter 3 on the definition of death is a masterpiece of
clarification. Having spent a frustrating year working on the matter
myself. I can say that I consider a
reading of this chapter to be a nearindispensable prerequisite for further thought in this area. Particularly
helpful is the distinction of three
senses of the word "definition" in
regard to death: theoretical, factual,
and operational. Some want to change
the theoretical definition from absence of integrated bodily life to noncapacity for consciousness or social
interaction. Prisez and Boyle argue
against any redefinition on this level.
But they suggest that the facts which
are sufficient to show death need not
be confined to absence of heartbeat
and respiration, but could include
the complete and irreversible loss of
functioning of the entire brain. Such
an updating of the factual definition
of death does not change the theoretical meaning of death, and might
well be the subject of a new statute.
However, the precise operational
definition of death (that is, the techniques by which physicians determine the absence of bodily functions)
should be largely left to the medical
profession, inasmuch as it is well not
to lock in particular techniques by
statute.
The substantive position of the authors is decidedly anti-euthanasia.
And, as individuals, they hold this
view fundamentally because of a personal adherence to the traditional
Christian sense of the sanctity of life.
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But they are also libertarians. That
is, they feel strongly and sincerely
that justice requires that no religious
view not part of a social consensus be
enacted into law. And they conclude
reluctantly that the Judea-Christian
consensus regarding life's sanctity no
longer prevails in our society. However, in the tradition of the influential legal theorist Yale Kamisar,
they feel there are compelling arguments against euthanasia which appeal only to liberty and to justice,
rather than to the sanctity of life. And
liberty and justice still command the
assent of the vast majority today.
In other words, killing per se does
not seem outrageous to many modern people, but injustice still does.
And Prisez and Boyle argue that the
legalization of euthanasia, even of
purely voluntary euthanasia, will inevitably lead to unjust consequences
to those who do not wish to be killed.
Therefore, it should remain illegal.
Many are already familiar with this
approach in the abortion debate.
Often someone will concede that
abortion kills a human being, but
will ask what is wrong with killing. A
common anti-abortion response is
that justice requires consistency. If
we are going to protect the strong, we
must also protect the weak. But note
that such a response does not insist
that there be laws against homicide.
It only argues that if we have such
laws, we must apply them fairly both
to the born and to the unborn. In
other words, the argument does not
appeal to the sanctity of life but to
justice. Or, again, sometimes those
who argue for freedom to choose
abortion are countered with a request that the unborn, too, should be
given freedom of choice. Such an
argument does not necessarily appeal
to life's sanctity; it does not, for example, exclude the possibility that
some number of unwanted children
might be killed upon their request at
a later date. It only says that they
should be free to live if they wish.
The principle of liberty seems quite
sufficient here to exclude abortion,
without invoking the sanctity of life.
What Prisez and Boyle do is to make
the much more difficult argument
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that liberty and justice also exclude
even voluntary euthanasia.
My only serious doubts regarding
the book are in regard to the derivation and authority of the idea of justice itself. I am not convinced that a
conscientious person can wholly
commit himself to an ideal of justice
which excludes his personal moral
beliefs, simply because these beliefs
may not be part of a social consensus.
For example, suppose that legalized
voluntary euthanasia happened not
to have the unforunate consequence
for society which the authors delineate. The state would then, according
to Prisez and Boyle's justice, have to
permit and protect the freedom to be
killed upon request. If I were to try
to stop a doctor from injecting poison
into my willing mother, the police
would come to hold me back while
the deadly deed were done. I do not
think that I, as a believer in the sanctity
of life, could support a state which
actively intervened to insure that immoral killing took place.
In other words, the liberty of which
the authors speak is really a righ~ and
one person's right is always another
person's duty. A right to be killed is
not a mere absence of state power. It
is not a return to a kind of "stage of
nature" in which the law would leave
me free to interpose myself between
the doctor and my mother. Instead,
the government would enforce a duty
upon everyone to allow such killing.
I could not in conscience consent to
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such a duty or to its enforcement, although I might be able to tolerate it
as the lesser of evils.
Unfortunately, I am not the only
one who has problems with the authors' development of their idea of
justice. When I used this book in a
law school seminar, most of my students shared this difficulty, though
not necessarily for my reasons. Both
those who favored and those who
opposed euthanasia found the derivation of justice at least confusing,
while their reflections to the rest of
the book were uniformly enthusiastic.
In other words, the arguments appealing to justice were to us much
more convincing than the arguments
validating justice as an ultimate
norm.
Now, these confusing arguments
occur both in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 13. The latter coming at the end,
should not be a stumbling block for
any reader, but the former may be.
Some readers may be so frustrated
by Chapter 2 that they lose confidence and do not go on to the valuable analysis which follows. Frankly,
I think that the solution in this case
would be simply to skip Chapter 2.
The authors' definitions of liberty
and justice emerge clearly enough in
the later text and are widely enough
accepted today not to need the perhaps inadequate justications the authors provide.
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In TimeFor Christmas
The herald angels' song is an everlasting antiphony . . . It moves down
the centuries above, beneath, and in
the earth from Christmas to Christmas to Christmas .. . In it alone is
hope before death and after death ...
Their song lives to the 2,000th Christmas, to the 3,000th, and at length to
the last Christmas the world will
see ... And on that final Christmas,
as on the first, the angels will know,
as we must know now, that the heart
which began to beat in Bethlehem
still beats in the world and for the
world ... And for us .. .

0. P. Kretzmann
The Pilgrim

Many years will pass before you understand Christmas ... In fact, you
will never understand it completely
... But you can always believe in it,
always . . . The Child has come to
keep us company ... To tell us that
heaven is nearer than we had dared
to think . . . To put the hope of
eternity in our eyes . .. To tell us
that the manger is never empty for
those who return to it ... And you
will find with Him, I know, a happiness which you will never find
alone ...

0. P. Kretzmann

A Free Gift Book for New Subscribers
Mail to:

0. P. Kretzmann, President of Valparaiso University from 1940 to 1968,
was also Editor of The Cresset from
1937 to 1968. In these two rare books
many of his beloved "The Pilgrim"
meditations were reprinted and are
now available to new Cresset subscribers as a gift to themselves- or
to give as a thoughtful Christmas gift
to friends. This offer expires December
10, 1979. Those who order early are
more likely to receive their gift book
in time for Christmas sharing-and
will miss fewer issues of The Cresset.
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